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McDANIELS v. FLICK: TERMINATING THE EMPLOYMENT OF
TENURED PROFESSORS-WHAT PROCESS IS DUE?
I. INTRODUCTION
The roots of "due process of law" are embedded deep within legal
history.' Prior to the American Revolution, the importance of citizens'
rights to life, liberty and property justified the existence of the State.2 In
the spring of 1789, the First Congress adopted the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, assuring that life, liberty and property
would not be deprived without due process of law.3 After the Civil War,
1. See Charles A. Miller, The Forest of Due Process of Law: The American Constitu-
tional Tradition, in DUE PROCESS: NoMos XVIII 3, 4 (1. Roland Pennock &John W.
Chapman eds., 1977) (describing due process tradition and history in America).
The concept of "due process of law" stems from the Magna Carta. Id. In Chapter
39 of the Charter of 1215, King John promised that "[n]o free man shall be taken
or imprisoned or disseised... except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the
law of the land." Id. (emphasis added). The phrase "law of the land" evolved into
the constitutional concept of "due process of law." Id. at 5-6. The original "law of
the land" concept, however, included both procedural and substantive compo-
nents. Id. See generally Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process Before the Civil
War, 24 HARV. L. REv. 366, 368-70 (1911) ("It has.., been demonstrated that the
phrase 'due process of law' is a variation of Magna Carta's 'according to the law of
the land,' which restricted the enforcement procedures available to English
monarchs."); Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REv. 1, 7-10
(1992) (examining Magna Carta as source of due process).
In addition, one commentator described the United States Supreme Court's
comparison of due process and the Magna Carta. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 10-7, at 664 (2d ed. 1988). Professor Tribe stated that the
Supreme Court analogized due process to the Magna Carta's "'guarantees against
the oppressions and usurpations' of the royal prerogative, in support of the basic
conclusion that due process 'is a restraint on ... the government, and cannot be so
construed as to leave congress.., free to make any process "due process of law," by
its mere will.'" Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land
& Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1856)); see also Hurtado v. Cali-
fornia, 110 U.S. 516, 531-32 (1884) (discussing significance of Magna Carta in de-
veloping due process).
2. See Miller, supra note 1, at 6-7. Following the philosophy ofJohn Locke, Sir
William Blackstone expounded upon the notion that the State exists to protect
life, liberty and property. Id. at 6. Blackstone's "three absolute rights of individu-
als" included: "(1) 'the right of... a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment
of his life . . .' (2) 'the personal liberty ... of moving one's person to whatsoever
place one's own inclination may direct . . .' (3) 'the third absolute right . . . of
property: which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisi-
tions."' Id. at 7 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129, 134, 138).
3. Id. at 10. The Fifth Amendment states that "[n]o person shall be . . . de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. V. This amendment was a culmination of similar concepts that, prior to
the Fifth Amendment's adoption, existed in other constitutional documents. See
Miller, supra note 1, at 10. In addition, the Fifth Amendment changed the lan-
guage in the Declaration of Independence, replacing the "pursuit of happiness"
(607)
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the Fourteenth Amendment was added to complement the Fifth Amend-
ment, providing an analogous guarantee to the states. 4
Thus, while these amendments established the primacy of due pro-
cess in our jurisprudence, uncertainty remained surrounding its defini-
tion, as well as the scope of the liberty and property it protected. 5 Even in
their earliest interpretations, courts included nontraditional property
within the reach of due process.6 At the same time, however, the "doc-
phrase with "property." Id. This change demonstrated that the founders intended
the Constitution to be a legal, rather than a purely political document, as judicial
interpretation of the "pursuit of happiness" would be a difficult task for legal schol-
ars. Id. This change also exhibited the nonrevolutionary temper of the Framers of
the Constitution; property, as compared to happiness, warranted special attention
in developing a system of government. Id.
Additionally, the "due process of law" language replaced the previous wording
of the "law of the land." Id. This change may have stemmed from the Supremacy
Clause's "law of the land" phrase. Id. at 10-11. If the Framers gave the phrase
another meaning in the Fifth Amendment, confusion may have resulted. Id. For a
general discussion of the scope of the Due Process Clause, see Leonard G. Ratner,
The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. Rv. 1048, 1050-75 (1968) (ex-
amining limitations placed upon Due Process Clause).
4. See Miller, supra note 1, at 16 (stating that Fourteenth Amendment reintro-
duced due process into constitutional language). The Fourteenth Amendment
states that "[n]o State shall . . .deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend XIV. See generally TRiBE, supra
note 1, §§ 10-7 to 10-19, at 663-768 (providing historical overview of effect and
significance of procedural due process in Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
Professor Tribe noted that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are historically
rooted "in the notion that conditions of personal freedom can be preserved only
when there is some institutional check on arbitrary government action." Id. § 10-7,
at 501; see also Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudica-
tion-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 340 (1957) (stating that due process
is required even in areas of "legitimate governmental concern").
5. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
(1950) ("Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of
the Due Process Clause ... ."). See generally B. Abbott Goldberg, "Interpretation" of
"Due Process of Law'--A Study in Futility, 13 PAC. L.J. 365 (1982) (providing overview
of ambiguous attempts at defining due process throughout history); Jeffrey M.
Gamso, Note, Tenured Public Employee Entitled to Pre-Termination Hearing Regardless of
Statutory Procedures for Dismissal. Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 17
TEX. TECH L. REv. 255, 256-57 (1986) (arguing that placement of Due Process
Clause in Bill of Rights and its source in law of England demonstrates importance
of concept).
6. See Gamso, supra note 5, at 257 (stating Supreme Court has long recog-
nized "property" to include some nonmaterial property). For example, in the
1901 case of Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419 (1901), the question presented
was whether the President could terminate for cause the petitioner's appointment
as Commissioner in Indian Territory. Id. at 425. An appointment terminable for
cause would entitle the Commissioner to due process protections. Id. The Court
recognized the possible application of due process protections and was prepared
to apply the "property" concept to an entitlement to employment. See Gamso,
supra note 5, at 257 (discussing Supreme Court's interpretation of whether ap-
pointment as Commissioner was terminable for cause). In a similar manner, early
cases recognized that a license to practice a certain trade could also be treated
similarly to a property right. Id. See generally Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 63-64
(1979) (finding horse trainer's license similar to property right); Goldsmith v.
608
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trine of privilege" restricted the constitutional rights of public employees
by denying adequate due process protections. 7 This doctrine eroded over
time, laying the foundation for a protected property right in continued
public employment.8 Nonetheless, an employer's termination of the right
to public employment creates confusion regarding exactly what process
the Due Process Clause dictates.9
United States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123 (1926) (accounting license);
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121-22 (1889) (physician's license); Ex parte
Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 512-13 (1873) (attorney's license).
7. See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (Mass. 1892)
("The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which
are offered him."); Lowell B. Howard, Jr., Cleveland Board of Education v.
Loudermill: Procedural Due Process Protection for Public Employees, 47 OHio ST. L.J.
1115, 1116-17 (1986) (detailing "doctrine of privilege"). Under this doctrine,
courts considered it a privilege, rather than a right, to retain government employ-
ment. Howard, supra, at 1116. Consequently, the government could discharge an
individual for no reason and deny him or her due process, without following any
constitutional standard. Id.; see also Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 59 (D.C. Cir.
1950) (defining civil service employment as statutory privilege, not constitutionally
protected right); Erik K. Foster, Federal Pre-Termination Rights for State Employees:
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1069, 1071 (1986)
(analyzing early characterization of public employment).
8. See Howard, supra note 7, at 1117 (discussing series of cases leading to
Court's recognition of property interest in public employment). The "doctrine of
privilege" remained in place until the late 1950s and 1960s, when the Warren
Court began retreating from the right/privilege dichotomy. Id. See generally
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771-85 (1964) (arguing for
expansion of rights requiring due process protection in light of increasing role of
public sector); William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968) (arguing that concept of privilege
is no longer viable in light of size and power of governmental role in public sec-
tor). Instead, the Court advocated a shift from the focus on governmental action
to a focus on the nature of the individually asserted interest. Howard, supra note 7,
at 1117; see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485-89 (1972) (concluding that
impartial hearing officer must conduct informal inquiry near place of alleged pa-
role violation in order to comply with due process); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,
80-93 (1972) (holding that state due process requires hearing before exercising
writ of replevin); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971) (finding that state must
provide procedure for considering fault before revoking driver's license);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-63 (1970) (finding that termination of welfare
benefits required due process protection); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 508
(1959) (holding that government violated employment statute when it denied
public employee safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination); Slochower v.
Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 559 (1956) (holding that employer violated
discharged public employee's due process rights when it summarily fired him for
invoking Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination). In 1971, the
Supreme Court marked the end of the right/privilege dichotomy. See Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 366 (1971) (" IT] his Court now has rejected the concept
that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is character-
ized as a 'right' or a 'privilege."'). But cf Comment, Entitlement, Enjoyment, and Due
Process of Law, 1974 DuKE L.J. 89, 98-99 (arguing that while Court explicitly rejected
right/privilege distinction, emerging "entitlement" doctrine is similar "if not
identical").
9. See generally Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 563 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("One way to avoid [the] subjective and varying inter-
3
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed
the requirements of the Due Process Clause in McDaniels v. Flick 10 In Mc-
Daniels, the court specifically explored the procedural due process rights
of a tenured professor discharged for sexually harassing a student." The
Third Circuit applied the general guidelines set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill.12 Interpreting
Loudermill broadly, the Third Circuit held that because the college gave
McDaniels adequate notice, explanation and opportunity to respond to
the charges against him, the college did not violate McDaniels's due pro-
cess rights.' 3
This Note analyzes the Third Circuit's holding in McDaniels v. Flick.14
Part II discusses the background and precedent defining the requirements
of a pretermination hearing, particularly analyzing Loudermill, the driving
force behind due process discussion.' 5 Part III sets forth the underlying
pretation of the Due Process Clause ... is to hold that one who avails himself of
government entitlements accepts the grant of tenure along with its inherent limita-
tions."); HENRY H. PERRr, JR., EMPLOYEE DIsMIsSAL LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 6.9 to
6.10, at 18-25 (3d ed. 1992) (discussing due process rights of public employees);
HenryJ. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1270-80 (1975)
(arguing that elements of required hearing is historically without precise defini-
tion); Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the
Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE LJ. 455, 456 (1986) (exploring both flexi-
ble and positivist models of due process requirements).
10. 59 F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1017 (1996).
11. Id. at 449-53. McDaniels maintained that the sexual harassment allega-
tions were false. Id. at 452.
12. 470 U.S. 532, 542-48 (1985). In Loudermill, the Supreme Court held that
"all the process that is due is provided by a pretermination opportunity to respond,
coupled with post-termination administrative procedures as provided by the ...
statute." Id. at 547-48. For a further discussion of the facts and holding of
Loudermill, see infra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
13. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 456-57. Specifically, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit held that Delaware County Community College
("DCCC") gave McDaniels adequate time to make a pretermination response to
the allegations against him, and that DCCC's grant of a post-termination right of
appeal to an impartial decision-maker sufficiently protected McDaniels's property
rights. Id.
14. Id. Specifically, the Third Circuit held that the time between a
pretermination meeting with administrators and the meeting at which the Board
of Trustees voted for termination provided McDaniels with enough time to make
an adequate response. Id. at 456. Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that DCCC
did not improperly deny McDaniels due process, even assuming a "sham"
pretermination hearing, because McDaniels had the opportunity of appealing the
Trustees' decision to an impartial decision-maker. Id. at 461. For a discussion of
the facts in McDaniels, see infra notes 108-35 and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of procedural due process rights and their devel-
opment, see infra notes 19-107 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
Loudermill facts and opinion, see infra notes 54-65 and accompanying text. For an
analysis of Loudermnilts impact upon procedural due process analysis, see Gamso,
supra note 5, at 269-72 (discussing Loudermill Court's forceful rejection of "bitter
with the sweet" principle); Howard, supra note 7, at 1125-30 (discussing Loudermill
decision's mandate for pretermination hearing before government discharge of
employee).
610
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facts of the McDaniels case.' 6 Part IV analyzes the majority and dissenting
opinions in McDaniels in light of Supreme Court precedent.17 Finally, Part
V suggests that although the McDaniels decision is consistent with
Loudermill and other procedural due process precedent, it will produce
results favorable to public employers.18
II. BACKGROUND: THE HISTORY OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
A. Property Rights and Due Process Requirements
The Constitution affords due process protection of property through
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.' 9 Historically, property rights did
not include the right to public employment.20 In the 1950s, however, the
Supreme Court began to actively apply procedural due process protec-
tions to public employment and benefits. 2 1 The Supreme Court's first
16. For a discussion of the facts of McDaniels, see infra notes 108-35 and ac-
companying text.
17. For an analysis of the majority's rationale in McDaniels, see infra notes 136-
79 and accompanying text. For an analysis of the dissenting opinion, see infra
notes 180-87 and accompanying text. For a critical analysis of the majority's opin-
ion, see infra notes 188-209.
18. For a discussion of McDaniels's impact upon procedural due process in the
employment field, see infra notes 210-17 and accompanying text.
19. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. The Fifth Amendment provides that "[nlo
person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
" U.S. CONST. amend. V. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
"[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend XIV. See Gamso, supra note 5, at 257 n.15
(stating that Supreme Court interprets both Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
provide equal safeguards and that "due process" applies to both amendments);
Robert F. Maslan, Jr., Bias and the Loudermill Hearing: Due Process or Lip Service to
Federal Law?, 57 FoRDHaM L. REv. 1093, 1094-95 n.17 (1989) (same).
20. For a further discussion of the right/privilege dichotomy in public em-
ployment, see supra note 7 and accompanying text. Even though the Supreme
Court stated that it would extend the scope of the term "property" beyond real
property and chattel, the Court was not sure whether public employment properly
fit within this structure. See Gamso, supra note 5, at 257 (stating that although
"property" means more than "real property" or "chattel" for significant time, there
were no clear qualifications for nontraditional property, such as entitlement to
employment); cf. William Van Alstyne, Crack in 'The New Property': Adjudicative Due
Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 445, 483 (1977) ("There is
something abrasive and offensive, something anachronistic, in the idea that public
sector positions can be appropriately described as the property of the individual
status holder .... ).
21. Foster, supra note 7, at 1071. In an early case, the Supreme Court de-
clared an Oklahoma statute unconstitutional because it conditioned employment
on nonmembership with a communist organization. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183, 191-92 (1952). The statute's unconstitutionality. rested in the fact that
the employer did not give employees the opportunity to explain the circumstances
surrounding their admitted membership. Id. at 190. While the Court did not pre-
cisely state that these employees had a property right in continued employment,
the Court prohibited the state from withholding employment on arbitrary
grounds. Id. at 192.
1996] NOTE
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substantial development in this area came in the twin cases of Board of
Regents v. Roth22 and Perry v. Sindermann.23
In Roth, a Wisconsin state university did not renew a first-year profes-
sor's contract at the end of the academic year. 24 Roth had no tenure
rights in continued employment. 25 In addition, the Rules of the Board of
Regents provided no protection for a nontenured professor who is not re-
Almost a decade later, the Court rendered its next opinion involving proce-
dural due process within public employment. Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers
Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). In McElroy, a naval commander
barred a civilian cook from entering the naval base and required her to turn in her
identification for security reasons. Id. at 887-88. The commander denied the
cook's opportunity to have a hearing and did not tell the cook the nature of the
charges. Id. at 888. In denying the cook's due process claims, the Court deter-
mined that due process determinations require an ad hoc balancing of the private
interests in retaining employment against the governmental interests in economy
and efficiency. Id. at 895. In addition, the Court stated that the due process clause
does not require an evidentiary hearing each time the government impairs a pri-
vate interest. Id. at 894. Finally, the Court held that in the absence of contrary
legislation, appointing officers can revoke government employment at will. Id. at
896.
In its final due process decision before Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), the Court held that the
government must give welfare recipients a full evidentiary hearing before it termi-
nates their benefits. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970). In Goldberg,
the Court held a New York statute unconstitutional because it allowed government
discontinuation of welfare benefits, even absent the recipient's failure to appear in
person to plead the case. Id. at 259-64. Most importantly, the Court stated that
because welfare benefits were "a matter of statutory entitlement for persons quali-
fied to receive them," these benefits were more like property than a privilege or
gratuity. Id. at 261-62. Because the benefits were similar to property rights, proper
due process safeguards must accompany any termination proceeding. Id. The
Court utilized the balancing mechanism it established in McElroy, but added to its
consideration the "extent to which [the welfare recipient] may be 'condemned to
suffer grievous loss."' Id. at 262-63 (quoting Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). Because the
livelihood of the recipient was at stake, the Court concluded that a full hearing
must precede the termination of benefits. Id. at 266.
22. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
23. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
24. Roth, 408 U.S. at 566. In 1968, Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh hired
David Roth as an assistant professor of political science. Id. Roth completed his
one-year term, at which time the University did not rehire him for the next aca-
demic year. Id. The University President gave Roth no reason for the decision and
no opportunity for a hearing. Id. at 568. See generally TRIBE, supra note 1, § 10-9, at
689-90 (tracing Supreme Court's development of due process in Roth); Doug
Rendelman, The New Due Process: Rights and Remedies, 63 Ky. L.J. 531, 546-50 (1975)
(discussing development of due process requirements in public employment).
25. Roth, 408 U.S. at 566. The Wisconsin statute confers tenure status to em-
ployees after four years of year-to-year employment. Id. A new teacher, however, is
entitled to nothing beyond the one-year appointment. Id. As there are no statu-
tory or administrative standards that guide or define eligibility for reemployment,
"[s]tate law thus clearly leaves the decision whether to rehire a nontenured
teacher for another year to the unfettered discretion of university officials." Id. at
566-67.
[Vol. 41: p. 607
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol41/iss2/6
1996] NOTE 613
employed. 26 The professor, however, claimed that the university violated
his right to freedom of speech as well as his due process right to notice.2 7
In assessing Roth's due process claim, the Supreme Court began with the
premise that if a Fourteenth Amendment liberty or property interest is
implicated, the "right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount."28 The
Court then examined the nature of the interest to determine whether
Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements applied.29 The Court
26. Id. at 567. The Rules provided that February 1 was the cutoff date for the
University to inform the nontenured professor of his nonretention for the follow-
ing year. Id. The Rules also stated that the University need not provide a reason
for nonretention and that due process required no review or appeal. Id. In ac-
cordance with these procedures, the University President did not give Roth a rea-
son for his termination or an opportunity to challenge the decision at a hearing.
Id. at 568.
27. Id. at 568-69. First, the professor substantively claimed that the University
did not rehire him because he made critical statements concerning the University,
and that the University's alleged retaliation violated his right to freedom of speech.
Id. Moreover, Roth alleged that the University's failure to give proper notice of
the reason for his nonretention or an opportunity for rehearing violated his right
to procedural due process. Id. at 569; see, e.g., Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128, 134-35
(6th Cir. 1971) (holding that due process does not require Board of Education to
give nonrenewed teacher hearing or explanation of reasons for termination); Fer-
guson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding that right to hearing
and explanation for nonretention are contingent upon employee's "expectancy'
of continued employment); Freeman v. Gould Special Sch. Dist., 405 F.2d 1153,
1161 (8th Cir. 1969) (stating that procedural due process does not require hearing
or right to cross-examine and confront witnesses).
28. Roth, 408 U.S. at 569-70; see Friendly, supra note 9, at 1268 (stating that
since 1970, "we have witnessed a due process explosion in which the Court has
carried the hearing requirement from one new area of government action to an-
other"). The Roth Court noted, however, that the "range of interests protected by
procedural due process is not infinite." Roth, 408 U.S. at 570. The Court stated
that the right to a hearing is applicable "'except for extraordinary situations where
some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing
until after the event."' Id. at 570 n.7 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
379 (1971)); see, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 598-600
(1950) (finding that due process does not require hearing before multiple seizures
of misbranded vitamins); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931)
("Where only property rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial en-
quiry [sic] is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity given for the ultimate
judicial determination of the liability is adequate."); see also TRIBE, supra note 1,
§ 10-14, at 718-31 (exploring issue of timing in pretermination hearing questions).
29. Roth, 408 U.S. at 570-72. The Court rejected Roth's claim that DCCC in-
fringed upon his liberty, stating that nothing suggests that Roth's "good name,
reputation, honor, or integrity" was at stake. Id. at 572-73. Addressing the proce-
dural due process claim, however, the Court acknowledged that property interests
take many forms. Id. at 576; see Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 209-10
(1971) (holding that due process requirements of hearing and inquiry applied to
recently hired teacher without tenure or contract); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
261-63 (1970) (describing application of due process to welfare benefits as statu-
tory entitlements); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960) (finding that
Due Process Clause acts as restraint upon modification of Social Security statute
and benefits); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 557-59 (1956) (finding
that city's discharge of tenured college professor violated professor's protected
property right in continued employment); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183,
7
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stated that "[p]roperty interests.. . are not created by the Constitution.
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules
or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support
claims of entitlement to those benefits."3 0 Therefore, the Court con-
cluded that Roth had no property interest; as a first-year teacher, he was
not yet eligible for the protections of the Wisconsin tenure statutes.3 1
Using the Roth criteria, however, the Court found a property interest
in continued employment in Pery v. Sindennann.3 2 In Sindermann, a state
college system that employed an untenured professor for ten years did not
renew that professor's contract.3 3 The professor argued that the college's
191-92 (1952) (stating that due process protects college professors and staff mem-
bers' continued employment interests where dismissed during contract term).
Although they take many forms, "property" interests have certain distinctive
features: a person must have "more than an abstract need or desire," a "unilateral
expectation" and a "legitimate claim of entitlement to" a property interest. Roth,
408 U.S. at 577.
30. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. Justice Stewart cited no authority for this proposi-
tion. Randall J. Andersen, Comment, Discharge of Employees Within the State Personnel
System: The Due Process Requirements for the Deprivation of Property and Liberty, 20 WAKE
FoREsT L. REv. 413, 417 n.34 (1983). The Court's reliance on the state law for its
argument that property was constitutionally protected effectively left the states with
the task of interpreting federal constitutional law in this area. Id.; see also Peter N.
Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of Roth and Perry, 71 CAL.
L. REv. 146, 192 (1983) (arguing that sovereign states define terms of property
rights, but federal courts are "ultimate arbiters" of constitutional due process). See
generally Rosario-Torres v. Hernandez-Colon, 889 F.2d 314, 319 (1st Cir. 1989)
("The sufficiency of a claim of entitlement to a property interest in public employ-
ment must be measured by, and decided with reference to, local law.").
31. Roth, 408 U.S. at 578. The Court reasoned that the terms of Roth's em-
ployment created and defined his property interest. Id. The property interested
assured Roth of employment only for one year; there was no provision for renewal.
Id. Thus, Roth had no claim to a property interest sufficient enough to necessitate
a hearing before DCCC declined to renew his contract. Id. In the dissenting opin-
ion,Justice Marshall argued that "property" should be defined broadly. Id. at 587-
88 (Marshall,J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated that "every citizen who applies
for a government job is entitled to it unless the government can establish some
reason for denying the employment." Id. at 588 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He fur-
ther explained that public employers must state why they deny or fail to renew
employment for only in knowing the reasons underlying government action will
citizens "feel secure and protected against arbitrary government action." Id. at 589
(Marshall,J, dissenting). In addition,Justice Marshall quotedjustice Frankfurter,
who stated that "'[t]he history of American freedom is, in no small measure, the
history of procedure."' Id. at 589-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Malinski v.
New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945)).
32. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). See generally Rendelman, supra note 24, at 546-50
(discussing development of due process rights in public employment).
33. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 594-95. Robert Sindermann was a teacher within
the Texas state college system from 1959-1969. Id. at 594. In 1965, Sindermann
became a professor at Odessa Junior College. Id. The College employed him for
four successive years under a series of one-year contracts. Id. In May 1969, the
Board voted not to offer Sindermann a new contract for the next academic year.
Id. at 595. The Board did not provide Sindermann with a statement of reasons for
his termination, nor did it allow him an opportunity to be heard to challenge his
614 [Vol. 41: p. 607
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failure to have a hearing violated his Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of
procedural due process.3 4 Citing Roth, the Sindermann Court noted that
due process requirements did not mandate a hearing unless the professor
could demonstrate that the college denied him a "property" interest in
continued employment.3 5 Contrary to Roth, the state statute in Sindermann
created a "de facto" tenure system.3 6 Therefore, the Court concluded that
this system created a property interest that obligated the college to grant
Sindermann a hearing at which he could challenge the grounds for his
nonretention.3 7
Thus, through its holdings in Roth and Sinderrann, the Court defined
the qualities of a property interest in continued public employment.3 8
Yet, because these two employment cases involved nonrenewal as opposed
to termination, the Supreme Court did not identify what requirements are
necessary to satisfy due process precisely.3 9
With Roth and Sindermann forming a foundation, the Court forged
forward with decisions concerning the termination of public employ-
dismissal. Id. For a general discussion of the Supreme Court's development of
due process in Sindermann, see TRIBE, supra note 1, § 10-9, at 689-90. For a further
discussion of Sindermann, see James E. Rogers & Danny R. Taulbee, Public School
Teachers and the Limits of Due Process Protection, 61 Ky. LJ. 830 (1973) (examining
due process within expanding property concepts); Rodger C. Field, Note, Public
Employees' Right to a Pre-Termination Hearing Under the Due Process Clause, 48 IND. L.J.
127, 131-35 (1972) (examining property theory of Sindermann).
34. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 595. In addition, as in Roth, Sindermann also
claimed that the College based its decision in part on retaliation for public criti-
cism of college administration policies. Id. Thus, Sindermann alleged that the
College infringed upon his right to free speech. Id.
35. Id. at 599 (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 564). For a discussion of Roth, see supra
notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
36. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 600-01. Sindermann alleged that his interest in
continued employment, though a contractual tenure provision did not formally
secure it, was instead secured by a "no less binding understanding fostered by the
college administration." Id. at 599-600. In support of his claim, Sindermann cited
both the official faculty guide, as well as the guidelines of the Coordinating Board
of the Texas College and University system. Id. at 600. The faculty guide states:
"Odessa College has no tenure system. The Administration of the College wishes
the faculty member to feel that he has permanent tenure as long as his teaching
services are satisfactory .... " Id. In view of these documents, the Court suggested
that the College might have an "unwritten 'common law"' that gave employees the
equivalent of tenure. Id. at 602.
37. Id. at 603. The Court noted that proof of a property interest would not
necessarily entitle Sindermann to reinstatement. Id.
38. For a specific statement of the concept of a property interest in continued
public employment, see supra text accompanying note 30.
39. See Howard, supra note 7, at 1120 (stating that Court did not reach issue of
due process requirements for pretermination procedures); see also TRIBE, supra
note 1, § 10-8, at 678 ("The actual elaboration by the Supreme Court of protected
interests and procedural safeguards has been an evolving process punctuated by
vague generalizations and declarations of broad, overarching principles." (foot-
note omitted)).
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ment.4 0 Specifically, an opportunity to address the need for pretermina-
tion hearings arose in Arnett v. Kennedy.41 In Arnett, after a tenured public
employee's dismissal, the supervisor gave the employee an opportunity to
appear before a hearing officer.42 But, upon learning that this hearing
officer was his supervisor, the employee objected procedurally and asked
for an impartial decision-maker. 43 The Court upheld the employee's dis-
missal, holding that a property interest is defined by the terms of the stat-
ute that created the property interest.44 In the plurality opinion, Justice
40. At various points in its history, the Supreme Court has set forth "pieces" of
the basic definition of procedural due process. For example, in Mullane v. Central
Hanover Trust Co., 339 U S. 306 (1950), the Court stated that "at a minimum ...
deprivation of life, liberty or property... [must] be preceded by notice and oppor-
tunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Id. at 313. The Court
also stated that such notice must be given "at a meaningful time and in a meaning-
ful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). Additionally, the
Court stated that "[tihe formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can
vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of
the subsequent proceedings." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971).
Similarly, Chief Justice Warren stated that "'[d]ue process' is an elusive concept.
Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies according to specific
factual contexts." Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
41. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
42. Id. at 137. In Arnett, a supervisor fired Kennedy, a non-probationary ten-
ured federal employee, for making defamatory statements accusing his supervisor
of offering bribes to a community organization. Id. at 136-37. The regional direc-
tor of the Office of Economic Opportunity advised Kennedy of the charges against
him and of his right to defend himself before a hearing officer in accordance with
the Lloyd-LaFollette Act. Id. In addition, the director also advised Kennedy that
the basis for the notice was available at the regional office. Id. See generally Philip
A. Byler, Comment, Fear of Firing: Arnett v. Kennedy and the Protection of Federal
Career Employees, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 472 (1975) (discussing facts and argu-
ing for broad view of procedural due process).
43. Arnett, 416 U.S. 136-37. The Lloyd-LaFollete Act, which was the federal
civil service statute, created a property right in continued employment. Id. at 151-
52. It did not, however, require a pretermination hearing with an impartial deci-
sion-maker. Id. at 152. Rather, it provided that such a hearing may be provided at
the discretion of the employer. Id. But cf. Foster, supra note 7, at 1077 n.54 (citing
Justice White's dissenting opinion in Arnett, which contends that due process re-
quires right to impartial decision-maker). See generally Richard C. McCrea, Jr.,
Loudermill-What Pretermination Process Is 'Due'Public Employees, 60 FLA. B.J. 37, 37-
38 (1986) (discussing plurality opinion in Arnett).
44. Arnett, 416 U.S. at 153-54. To hold otherwise, the Court stated, would
present a "hobbling restriction" on legislative authority in this area. Id. at 154.
The Arnett Court reasoned that because Congress chose to enact the Lloyd-LaFol-
lette Act and unmistakenly refused to grant a full adversary hearing for a determi-
nation of "cause," to grant Kennedy such a hearing would give him what Congress
expressly withheld from him in enacting this statute. Id. Further, the Court rea-
soned that the Due Process Clause did not require a restriction on legislative au-
thority in this manner. Id.
On the contrary, in the concurring opinion, Justice Powell stated that the
right to procedural due process is "conferred not by legislative grace, but by consti-
tutional guarantee." Id. at 167 (Powell, J., concurring). Utilizing a balancing test
similar to the test set forth in Mathews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), Justice
Powell concluded that the procedure satisfied Kennedy's due process require-
10
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Rehnquist stated that "where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably
intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be em-
ployed in determining that right, a litigant ... must take the bitter with
the sweet."
45
In the years following Arnett, the Third Circuit was the first circuit
court to address the pretermination safeguards applicable to professors.46
First, the Third Circuit adopted a list of permissive pretermination safe-
guards in Chung v. Park.47 This list included written notice of the grounds
for termination, as well as a neutral and detached hearing body.48 Less
ments. Arnett, 416 U.S. at 171 (Powell, J., concurring). For a discussion of the
Mathews balancing test, see infra note 63.
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall stated that the due process clause
mandates a full evidentiary hearing prior to discharge. Arnett, 416 U.S. at 206
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
45. Arnett, 416 U.S. at 154. In simple terms, the "bitter with the sweet" princi-
ple states that "to take advantage of a government benefit which has strings at-
tached is, necessarily, to acknowledge that right of the government to attach those
strings." Gamso, supra note 5, at 262; see, e.g., United States v. San Francisco, 310
U.S. 16, 30 (1940) (upholding congressional attachment of conditions to grant of
land); Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U.S. 415, 421-22 (1880) (forbidding challenge to
ordinance's constitutionality where party avails himself of law for his or her bene-
fit). But see Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980) (stating that as minimum
requirements of procedural due process are matter of federal law, "they are not
diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own procedures").
46. See Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 669 F.2d 142, 154 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding
that college's notification of professor prior to hearing and granting him opportu-
nity to be heard satisfied nontenured procedural due process requirements);
Chung v. Park, 514 F.2d 382, 387 (3d Cir. 1975) (stating that due process was
satisfied in view of interests of professor and college, if termination procedures
were not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious).
47. 514 F.2d 382, 386 (3d Cir. 1975). Mansfield State College employed Pro-
fessor Chung from 1967-1972. Id. at 384. The College offered Chung a contract
extension at the end of every year. Id. In 1971, however, the president recom-
mended that the Board of Trustees not rehire Chung. Id. The parties setup an
arbitration hearing to review the issue, at which time the president fully notified
Chung of the reasons for termination and gave him documents upon which the
College relied in making the decision. Id. The issue before the arbitration panel
was whether the decision to deny continued employment was arbitrary or capri-
cious. Id. The court of appeals upheld the arbitration panel's test, namely that
"[i]f the procedure used by the college is adequate to prevent unreasonable, arbi-
trary or capricious termination decisions, it satisfies due process." Id. at 387. Thus,
because the College informed Chung of the grounds for the pretermination hear-
ing and gave him an opportunity to respond, the College fulfilled due process
requirements. Id.; see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972) (stating
that function of hearing is to inform professor of grounds for nonretention and to
allow him or her to challenge their sufficiency).
48. Chung, 514 F.2d at 386. In total, the list of permissive standards included:
(1) written notice of the grounds for termination; (2) disclosure of the
evidence supporting termination; (3) the right to confront and cross-ex-
amine adverse witnesses; (4) an opportunity to be heard in person and to
present witnesses and documentary evidence; (5) a neutral and detached
hearing body; and (6) a written statement by the fact finders as to the
evidence relied upon.
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than a decade later, the Third Circuit adhered to the Chung decision in
Skehan v. Board of Trustees.49 In Skehan, a state college did not renew a
nontenured professor's contract.50 The professor claimed that the college
violated his due process rights because the college did not conduct a hear-
ing at which the professor could have justified his actions or contested his
dismissal.5 ' The Third Circuit denied this claim, stating that the professor
was entitled to "minimum procedural safeguards which are adapted to the
particular characteristics of the interests involved and the limited nature
of the controversy."52 Thus, even in the years preceding the pivotal
Supreme Court decision in this area, the Third Circuit recognized mini-
mum due process requirements for tenured and nontenured professors. 53
This limited standard of procedural due process governed until Cleve-
land Board of Education v. Loudermill.54 In Loudermill, school officials fired a
school security guard without a hearing after finding that he lied on his
job application about having no felony record.55 Loudermill appealed
49. 669 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1982).
50. Id. at 144. Bloomsburg State College employed Professor Skehan for one
and a half years. Id. After this period, the College decided not to renew Skehan's
contract. Id. Skehan claimed that the nonrenewal decision violated his right to
due process. Id. The district court found that Skehan's one-year contract was a
property interest within the meaning of Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972) and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Skehan, 669 F.2d at 144. Ap-
plying its prior holding in Chung, the Third Circuit held that the College's
pretermination procedures satisfied the due process requirements. Id. at 152. For
a further discussion of the Roth and Sindermann decisions upon which the Skehan
court relied, see supra notes 22-37 and accompanying text.
51. Skehan, 669 F.2d at 144. The College, however, notified Skehan of his
termination and explained the hearing procedures to follow. Id. at 149-50.
52. Id. at 152 (quoting Chung, 514 F.2d at 386).
53. For a further discussion of other cases dealing with tenured professors
and college faculty members, see infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
54. 470 U.S. 532 (1985). Prior to Loudermill, the Supreme Court set forth a
confusing opinion in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). In Bishop, the Supreme
Court upheld a policeman's dismissal where the relevant city ordinance classified
the officer as a "permanent employee." Id. at 350. The Supreme Court followed
the interpretation of both the North Carolina district court and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which held that a so-called permanent
employee "'held his position at the will and pleasure of the city,"' if the contract
did not specify a duration. Id. at 345 (quoting Bishop v. Wood, 377 F. Supp. 501,
505 (W.D.N.C. 1973)). Moreover, the Supreme Court held that because the city
ordinance did not create a property interest in continued employment, the federal
due process requirements did not apply. Id. at 347.
55. Loudermill 470 U.S. at 534. Loudermill consisted of two petitions. Id. at
535. First, in 1979, the Cleveland Board of Education hired Loudermill as a secur-
ity guard. Id. Loudermill stated on his job application that he had never been
convicted of a felony. Id. Less than one year later, as part of a routine examina-
tion of employee records, the Board found that Loudermill had a grand larceny
charge on his record. Id. In November 1980, the Board's business manager sent
Loudermill a letter, informing him that the Board voted to dismiss him because of
his dishonest remark on the application. Id. The Board did not give Loudermill
the opportunity to respond to this charge or to challenge his dismissal. Id.
[Vol. 41: p. 607
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this dismissal under both state and federal law.56 The federal district
court judge dismissed Loudermill's complaint because his employer fol-
lowed the due process procedures set forth in the state statute.5 7 In a
landmark decision, however, the Supreme Court held that an employer
cannot discharge a tenured public employee without some pretermination
right to respond to the charges, regardless of what procedures are set
forth in the state statute. 58 Although rejecting Arnett,59 the Loudermill
Court cited its concurring opinion, which stated that the "right to due
Loudermill appealed his termination to the Cleveland Civil Service Commission,
which upheld the dismissal. Id. at 535-36.
In the second petition, respondent Donnelly was a bus mechanic for the
Parma Board of Education. Id. at 536. The Board fired Donnelly for failing an eye
examination. Id. Although the Board gave Donnelly a chance to retake the test,
Donnelly did not do so; instead, in a manner similar to Loudermill, Donnelly ap-
pealed to the Civil Service Commission and later to the district court, challenging
the constitutionality of dismissal procedures. Id. at 536-37. The district court then
consolidated the Loudermill and Donnelly cases for purposes of appeal. Id. at 537.
56. Id. State law classified Loudermill as a "classified civil servant." Id. at 535
(citing OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 124.11 (1984)). As this provision granted
Loudermill the opportunity for administrative review if discharged for cause,
Loudermill filed an appeal with the Cleveland Civil Service Commission. Id. At his
hearing, Loudermill stated "that he had thought that his 1968 larceny conviction
was for a misdemeanor rather than a felony." Id. Despite the fact that the hearing
referee recommended Loudermill's reinstatement, the Civil Service Commission
upheld his dismissal. Id. at 535-36.
57. Id. at 536. In district court, Loudermill claimed that the Ohio statute was
unconstitutional on its face because it "did not provide the employee [with] an
opportunity to respond to the charges against him prior to removal." Id. The
district court dismissed this complaint on the grounds that "the very statute that
created the property right in continued employment also specified the procedures
for discharge." Id.
58. Id. at 540-41. In so holding, the Court rejected the previous "bitter with
the sweet" approach created in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 154 (1974).
Loudermnil 470 U.S. at 541. But seeJenniferJaff, Hiding Behind the Constitution: The
Supreme Court and Procedural Due Process in Cleveland Board of Education v.
Loudermill, 18 AKRON L. REv. 631, 631 (1985) (arguing that Court should have
affirmed Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Arnett because clearly articulated
rules of law allow holders of entitlements to know "what procedures they would be
afforded at the time the entitlement was granted").
Writing for the majority, Justice White stated that the "categories of substance
and procedure are distinct." Loudermil4 470 U.S. at 541. But see id. at 560 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) ("[Wie decline to conclude that the substantive right may be
viewed wholly apart from the procedure provided for its enforcement."). In the
concurring opinion, Justice Marshall explained the need for a rigorous
pretermination hearing. Id. at 548 (Marshall, J., concurring). He stated that the
individual's interest in continued employment mandates a pretermination hearing
allowing the employee to test evidence against him "by confronting and cross-ex-
amining adverse witnesses and by presenting witnesses on his own behalf." Id. (cit-
ing Arnett, 416 U.S. at 214 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
59. Arnett, 416 U.S. at 134. For a further discussion of the facts and decision
in Arnett, see supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
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process is 'conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional
guarantee."' 60
While the Loudermill Court created certainty regarding the necessity
of procedural due process safeguards, the remaining question was exactly
what process is due.6 1 The Court first determined that "some form of
pretermination hearing" is necessary. 62 The Court reasoned that the need
for such a hearing "is evident from a balancing of the competing interests
at stake."63 Supplementing this rule, the Court stated that "[t]he essential
60. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541 (quoting Arnett, 416 U.S. at 167 (Powell, J.,
concurring)). The Loudermill Court further affirmed Justice Powell's statement
that "' [w] hile the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest in [public]
employment, it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an inter-
est, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards."' Id. (quoting Ar-
nett, 416 U.S. at 167 (Powell, J., concurring)). But see TRIBE, supra note 1, § 10-12,
at 709-10 (arguing that Loudermill Court "failed to provide fully convincing basis"
for rejecting Arnett decision). Professor Tribe stated that the Loudermill Court
"merely reasserted the rationale... of limiting the government's powers to dictate
procedural protections." Id. at 710. Professor Tribe concluded that the position
of the Loudermill Court "must rest on a notion that the Constitution treats certain
procedural protections as mandatory incidents in the creation of any relationship
terminable only on stated substantive conditions." Id.
61. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541. With respect to the "bitter with the sweet"
confusion of the earlier courts, "Loudermill may finally put to rest that hoary relic of
earlier due process theory." Gamso, supra note 5, at 269. For a general historical
analysis of the requirements of due process, see Note, Specifying the Procedures Re-
quired by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REv.
1510, 1537-38 (1974) (noting that natural law concepts defined early due process
procedures).
62. Loudermil4 470 U.S. at 542; see also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
569-70 (1972) ("When protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of
prior hearing is paramount."); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972) (re-
quiring opportunity for hearing when property interest is involved); Frederick v.
Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 892 F. Supp. 122, 126 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (requiring
"some kind of hearing" prior to discharge of state employee) (quoting Loudermill,
470 U.S. at 542). The Court further stated that the pretermination hearing itself
"need not be elaborate." Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545. In addition, the Court deter-
mined that the pretermination hearing should provide an initial check against mis-
taken decisions. Id.
63. Id. at 542. In Mathews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Supreme Court
defined the three competing interests:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; sec-
ond, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, in-
cluding the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335.
The Loudermill Court expanded upon these competing interests. Loudermill,
470 U.S. at 543-45. First, the Court recognized that while a fired worker may find
employment elsewhere, the process will be time-consuming and the questionable
circumstances under which the worker left his or her prior job may taint the
worker. Id. at 543. Thus, the "severity of depriving a person of the means of liveli-
hood" requires that employers utilize the pretermination hearing process. Id. In
addition, the Court stated that allowing "meaningful opportunity to invoke the
14
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requirements of due process ... are notice and an opportunity to re-
spond. '64 In conclusion, the Court stated that "all the process that is due
is provided by a pretermination opportunity to respond, coupled with
post-termination administrative procedures as provided by the... [state]
statute."
6 5
B. Post-Loudermill Attempts at Clarification
Although the Loudermill guidelines established the necessity of
pretermination hearings, the circuit courts were left to discern the particu-
lars of these general guidelines. 66 First, the circuit courts addressed the
timing and form of the notice requirement.67 Second, the circuit courts
explored the role of pretermination and post-termination hearings in pro-
viding employees with an opportunity to respond to allegations. 68 Finally,
discretion of the decisionmaker" before termination occurs will reduce the risk or
erroneous decisions. Id.; see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975) ("Requiring
effective notice and informal hearing... will provide a meaningful hedge against
erroneous actions."); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 784-86 (1973) (stressing
importance of substantial protection against "ill-considered revocation"). For a de-
tailed analysis of the Mathews factors, see Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due
Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors
in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHi. L. REv. 28, 37-46 (1976).
64. Loudermil, 470 U.S. at 546; see also School District of Phila. v. Pennsylvania
Milk Mktg. Bd., 877 F. Supp. 245, 253 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (stating that notice and
opportunity for hearing are "root requirements" of due process (quoting Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971))); Michael L. Smith & James A. Vlasicak,
The Fair and Legal Way to Discharge the Public Employee, 10 CuRRENT MUN. PROBS. 265,
270 (1985). See generally Stephen N. Subrin & A. Richard Dykstra, Notice and the
Right to Be Heard: The Significance of Old Friends, 9 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 449, 474-
80 (1974) (discussing importance of notice and hearing). The importance of the
opportunity to be heard derives from the fact that "[t]he employee may make
admissions at this time which would reinforce the employers' decision if the dis-
charge is later litigated." Id. Conversely, the employee may offer a good defense
and the employer may decide to reconsider a discharge decision. Id.
Applying the second prong of the Mathews balancing test to the requirements
of notice and opportunity to respond, the Loudermill Court held that an opportu-
nity for respondents to be heard "would impose neither a significant administra-
tive burden nor intolerable delays." Loudermil4 470 U.S. at 544. In light of the
facts of Loudermil4 the Court stated that keeping an employee on the payroll until
the pretermination hearing may be beneficial to the employer. Id.
65. Loudermil4 470 U.S. at 547-48. The Loudermill Court previously stated that
"[t]he tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges
against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to
present his side of the story." Id. at 546.
66. For a further discussion of circuit court interpretations of the Loudermill
decision, see infra notes 70-107 and accompanying text.
67. For a further discussion of the notice requirement, see infra notes 70-79
and accompanying text.
68. For a further discussion of pretermination hearing requirements, see infra
notes 80-94 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of post-termination
hearing requirements, see infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
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recent circuit court decisions provide guidance in discerning what due
process requires for termination of a tenured professor. 69
In Gniotek v. City of Philadelphia,70 the Third Circuit discussed whether
city police inspectors satisfied due process in their dismissal of city police
officers for accepting unlawful bribes.71 The Third Circuit held that a po-
lice inspector provided police officers with adequate due process protec-
tions where the official first gave the officers notice and an opportunity to
be heard at the initial pretermination hearing. 72 In summary, the Third
Circuit stated that no advance notice of a pretermination hearing is re-
69. For a further discussion of recent circuit opinions addressing due process
requirements relating to the termination of tenured professors, see infra notes 99-
106 and accompanying text.
70. 808 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 1986).
71. Id. at 242-43. The Gniotek case arose out of events surrounding the 1984
Philadelphia Police corruption trials. Id. at 242. At these trials, witnesses identi-
fied Gniotek and other appellants as police officers who received unlawful bribes.
Id. Investigators reported this information to the Police Commissioner, who com-
manded an office investigator to investigate Gniotek and others. Id. The next day,
the office investigator issued Gniotek and others a "Notice of Suspension with In-
tent to Dismiss." Id. Each police officer appeared before the investigator, who
explained the charges and immediately enforced the suspension. Id. In addition,
the investigator gave the officers the opportunity to make a statement. Id. Each
officer chose to remain silent. Id. Four days later, the investigators served the
officers "Notices of Intention to Dismiss." Id. The notices provided the option to
exercise the right of review within ten days. Id. Because Gniotek nor the other
officers chose this option, the investigator subsequently dismissed them. Id.
72. Id. at 244. The court noted that "[n]otice is sufficient (1) if it apprises the
vulnerable party of the nature of the charges and general evidence against him
and (2) if it is timely under the particular circumstances of the case." Id. (citing
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975)). Applying these standards, the court
found that the summary of evidence provided to Gniotek and the others was of
"such specificity" as to allow them to determine what evidence to present in mitiga-
tion of the charges. Id. In addition, the court stated that "[1] ack of advance notice
... does not constitute a per se violation of due process." Id.; see, e.g., Goss, 419 U.S.
at 582 (stating that "[t] here need be no delay between the time 'notice' is given
and the time of hearing"). The Third Circuit, however, reiterated the necessity of
balancing the timing and content of notice with the competing interests involved.
Gniotek, 808 F.2d at 244-45 (citing Goss, 419 U.S. at 579); see also Bradley v. Pitts-
burgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1077-78 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that suspen-
sion without pay requires prior notice and hearing).
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quired. 73 In addition, the Third Circuit has found that notice given at a
pretermination hearing may even be given orally.7 4
The Third Circuit also addressed the notice requirement in Morton v.
Beyer.75 In Morton, a prison investigator informed Morton, a corrections
sergeant, that there would be a meeting to address a "general allegation of
inmate abuse." 76 At the hearing, the prison investigator provided Morton
with a copy of the incident's investigative reports, to which Morton de-
clined to respond. 77 Based on this information, the Third Circuit con-
cluded that the "presentation of adverse evidence within minutes of
ineffective notice simply does not comport with the due process require-
73. Gniotek, 808 F.2d at 244. Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit held that giving notice at a deprivation hearing satisfies due pro-
cess requirements. Brasslett v. Cota, 761 F.2d 827, 836 (lst Cir. 1985). In Brasslett,
a town fired its former fire chief for remarks he made during a television show. Id.
at 827-28. Brasslett argued that the town denied his procedural due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment because he did not receive a pretermination
hearing and because there was not an impartial decision-maker. Id. at 833. The
Brasslett court determined that the one-hour deprivation hearing was adequate be-
cause the town notified Brasslett of discharge possibility and provided him with an
opportunity to defend the allegations. Id. at 836. In reaching its decision, the
court relied on the principle that a pretermination hearing "need only be exten-
sive enough to guard against mistaken decisions." Id.
74. Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't, 840 F.2d 1139, 1145 (3d Cir.
1988). A commanding police officer dismissed Copeland, a policeman, from the
department for using illegal drugs. Id. at 1142. Copeland relied upon the Third
Circuit's opinion in Gniotek, claiming that the written notice provided in Gniotek
created a higher standard regarding notice, which the commanding officer did not
meet when he failed to provide him with any information concerning the charges.
Id. at 1145. The commanding officer told Copeland both before and during his
pretermination hearing that tests indicated marijuana use. Id. The Third Circuit
found such notice to be sufficient, given Copeland's status as a police officer and
his knowledge of the positive drug test. Id. In addition, the court found that these
factors satisfied the requirement that Copeland be aware of "'the substance of rele-
vant supporting evidence."' Id. (quoting Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S.
252, 264 (1987)).
75. 822 F.2d 364 (3d Cir. 1987).
76. Id. at 370. Morton was a corrections sergeant at Trenton State Prison. Id.
at 366. In September 1985, an inmate filed charges against Morton and other
officers alleging that the officers entered the inmate's cell and assaulted him. Id.
An investigator interviewed Morton on the day of the alleged incident, and Morton
denied any encounter with the inmate. Id. The investigator did not decide to take
action against Morton until March 1986. Id. At that time, the investigator sent
Morton a memo advising him of his immediate suspension from duty. Id.
77. Id. The prison investigator informed Morton that the meeting "was in-
tended to provide Morton with a hearing." Id. After Morton declined to offer his
version of the alleged incident, the investigator informed him that he was sus-
pended without pay. Id. According to Morton, this "hearing" lasted only ten min-
utes. Id. The investigator gave Morton a written report, entitled "LOUDERMILL
HEARING," which summarized the meeting. Id. at 366-67.
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ments set forth in Loudermill.' 78 The Morton decision would prove to be
important in defining the concept of notice in Loudermill.79
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit attempted
to clarify the adequacy of response time in Derstein v. Kansas.0 ° In Derstein,
a judge dismissed a tenured court employee accused of sexually harassing
other employees in a case with facts strikingly similar to those in McDaniels
v. Fick.8 1 Thejudge gave the employee ten days to resign, after which the
78. Id. at 371. Similarly, the Third Circuit noted that the administrator did
not afford the employee "timely notice of the nature of the charges or the general
evidence against him." Id. The Morton court distinguished its holding from the
holding in Gniotek v. City of Philadelphia, 808 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 1986). Morton, 822
F.2d at 371. Both cases concerned individuals who were silent when given the
opportunity to respond at a pretermination hearing. In Gniotek, corrupt police
officers remained silent, fearful of the consequences attending future statements,
after their commanding officer told them about criminal investigations beginning
against them. Gniotek, 808 F.2d at 244. The court found that the commanding
officer gave Gniotek and the others adequate notice. Id.
In contrast, Morton did not respond in this case because he was not aware of
the content and ramifications of the case against him. Morton, 822 F.2d at 371.
The Morton court believed that Morton was silent because he did not receive notice
of the charges against him. Id. Notably, the prison investigator presented Morton
with evidence underlying the charges. Id. The investigator, however, did not
properly inform Morton about the actual charge. Id. The prison investigator
urged the Third Circuit not to allow Morton's silence to "obscure the adequacy of
the opportunity provided to him." Id. at 369. Moreover, six months elapsed be-
tween the time of the alleged incident and the suspension. Id. at 370. Although
the investigator initially questioned Morton about the allegation, Morton did not
know that an investigation was ongoing six months later. Id. Moreover, the brief
notice on the day of the "hearing" did not set forth specific charges against Mor-
ton; consequently, Morton was unable to properly respond. Id.
79. As Morton was important in further defining Loudermill, so also was a re-
cent Third Circuit opinion in which the court held that the Borough Council did
not violate a city patrolman's due process rights when it provided the patrolman
notice of the charges against him. Edmundson v. Borough of Kennett Square, 4
F.3d 186, 194 (3d Cir. 1993). At several points during the meeting between the
patrolman and the Borough Council, the patrolman protested his termination. Id.
Although the mayor was impatient with the patrolman, the mayor granted the pa-
trolman an adequate opportunity to respond to the charges. Id. The Third Cir-
cuit held that the due process procedures complied with Loudermill standards
because the mayor gave the patrolman an appropriate post-termination hearing.
Id. Thus, the Edmundson decision reaffirmed the Third Circuit's trend of interpre-
tation, as well as the trend among the other circuit courts-namely, that the
Loudermill standards require only a minimal pretermination process. For a further
discussion of Third Circuit cases interpreting Loudermill, see supra notes 70-79 and
accompanying text. For a further discussion of how other circuit courts interpret
Loudermill, see infra notes 80-106 and accompanying text.
80. 915 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1990).
81. Id. at 1411. In Derstein, employees complained to the Kansas Judicial
Branch that Derstein, a tenured employee, sexually harassed other employees. Id.
at 1412. After some investigation, the state administrative judge asked Derstein to
meet with him in chambers the next day. Id. The judge did not inform Derstein
of the meeting's purpose until the meeting began. Id. The judge subsequently
gave Derstein ten days within which to resign or be terminated. Id. The judge also
informed Derstein about his right to appeal. Id. Ten days later, the judge pro-
vided Derstein with a termination letter that further described his appeals rights
[Vol. 41: p. 607
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judge would terminate his employment.82 The Tenth Circuit found that
the court's procedures did not violate the employee's procedural due pro-
cess rights, stating that the pretermination meeting "provided Derstein all
that was necessary under Loudermill-notice . . . and an opportunity to
respond."83
Likewise, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
adhered to the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in holding that a county em-
ployer denied due process protections to a county employee in Adams v.
SeweIL8 4 In Adams, the county employer provided Adams with no notice or
opportunity to prepare for his pretermination hearing. 85 While the court
stated that a flaw in a pretermination hearing is not necessarily fatal, the
court concluded that the three-step post-termination hearing process that
the employer granted Adams did not cure the pretermination procedural
flaws. 86 Therefore, although reaching a conclusion opposite to that of the
Derstein court, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed the principle that
pretermination and post-termination hearings must be analyzed in con-
junction when determining whether due process requirements are
satisfied. 8 7
Another issue needing definition after Loudermill was whether due
process requires an impartial decision-maker at the pretermination hear-
and provided details concerning the charges against him. Id. Derstein appealed,
but the board of appeals dismissed his appeal as "frivolous." Id.
82. Id. at 1412.
83. Id. at 1413. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
demonstrated its broad interpretation of due process requirements, stating that
"[a] pretermination hearing was never intended to be an adjudicative detailed pro-
ceeding." Id. Rather, because the judge provided Derstein with an opportunity to
have a post-termination hearing, the employer fully complied with Loudermil's due
process requirements. Id. at 1414.
84. 946 F.2d 757 (11th Cir. 1991).
85. Id. at 765. The County Environmental Protection Department employed
Adams for fifteen years. Id. at 760. A co-worker of Adams's reported him to
county officials for sexually harassing another worker. Id. The County Administra-
tor called Adams to a meeting, at the close of which the administrator placed Ad-
ams on paid personal leave and asked him to resign. Id.
86. Id. at 766. Specifically, Adams contested the adequacy and fairness of the
hearing, along with the impartiality of the County's Grievance Adjustment Board.
Id.
87. In some instances, the Supreme Court has held that a statutory provision
providing a post-termination hearing satisfies procedural due process. See, e.g., Lo-
gan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436 (1982) ("'[T]he necessity of
quick action by the State or the impracticality of providing any predeprivation pro-
cess,' may mean that a post-deprivation remedy is constitutionally inadequate."
(quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 (1981))); Memphis Light, Gas &
Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19 (1978) (stating that prior hearing may not be
required "where the potential length or severity of the deprivation does not indi-
cate a likelihood of serious loss and where the procedures ... are sufficiently relia-
ble to minimize the risk of erroneous determination"); Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651, 682 (1977) (holding that hearing not required before corporal punish-
ment of junior high school students).
1996] NOTE
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ing.88 Although the Third Circuit addressed this question in a separate
context,8 9 the Eleventh Circuit dealt with the issue more recently in Mc-
Kinney v. Pate,90 where a county employee challenged the Board of Com-
missioners' termination procedures. 91 McKinney acknowledged that the
Board followed "facially" adequate due process, but alleged that the Board
was determined to find against him, regardless of the evidence
presented.92 The Eleventh Circuit stated that in an employment termina-
tion case, "'due process [does not] require the state to provide an impar-
tial decisionmaker at the pretermination hearing."' 93 The state is only
88. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 191-94 (1982) (stating that while
due process demands impartiality on part of hearing officers, presumption exists
that such officers are unbiased); Maslan, supra note 19, at 1093 (stating that courts
disagree over extent to which personal bias may invalidate pretermination
hearings).
Some courts conclude that where biased decision-makers oversee hearings,
the hearing is inherently unfair. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 199
(1974) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that some
situations present risk of bias too great to tolerate); Mathews v. Harney County
Sch. Dist. No. 4, 819 F.2d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that pretermination
hearing before school board violated due process where board decided to termi-
nate employee prior to meeting); Washington v. Kirksey, 811 F.2d 561, 564 (lth
Cir. 1987) (finding that decision-maker violated due process by failing to honor
agreement made at pretermination hearing); Salisbury v. Newport Hous. Auth.,
615 F. Supp. 1433, 1441 (E.D. Ky. 1985) (determining that housing authority mem-
bers personally involved in termination process could not conduct pretermination
hearings). Other courts hold that bias at the pretermination hearing is not a due
process violation. See, e.g., Duchesne v. Williams, 849 F.2d 1004 (6th Cir. 1988) (en
banc) (concluding that meaningless due process hearing did not offend due pro-
cess); Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709, 716 (5th Cir. 1987) (same).
89. See Rosa v. Resolution Trust Corp., 938 F.2d 383, 396-97 (3d Cir. 1991)
(holding that decision-maker's alleged bias did not violate due process because of
opportunity for post-deprivation review of claim).
90. 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995).
91. Id. at 1554-55.
92. Id. at 1561. In particular, McKinney acknowledged that the Board pro-
vided him with written notice of the charges against him and that he received an
explanation of the Board's evidence at the Board meeting. Id. Additionally, Mc-
Kinney had the opportunity to present his side of the story with the assistance of
counsel. Id. Thus, as the Board satisfied the essential Loudermill requirements,
only the allegation of bias stood in the way of sufficient due process. Id. at 1561-62.
The McKinney court stated, however, that "[a] demonstration that the deci-
sionmaker was biased ... is not tantamount to a demonstration that there has been
a denial of procedural due process." Id. at 1562.
93. Id. (quoting Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709, 715-16 (5th Cir.
1987)); see also Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 58 (1975) ("That the combination
of investigative and adjudicative functions does not, without more, constitute a due
process violation, does not, of course, preclude a court from determining from the
special facts and circumstances present in the case before it that the risk of unfair-
ness is intolerably high."); Crocker v. Fluvanna County Bd. of Pub. Welfare, 859
F.2d 14, 17 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding that state employee received due process when
given notice, hearing, opportunity to respond and full post-termination adversarial
hearing before an impartial panel); Garraghty v. Jordan, 830 F.2d 1295 (4th Cir.
1987) (deciding that Loudermill did not require pretermination hearing to be held
before impartial decision-maker). Compare Walker v. City of Berkeley, 951 F.2d
626
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required to provide an employee with the "means by which [the em-
ployee] can receive redress for the deprivations."9 4
The Eleventh Circuit based its holding upon the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Parratt v. Taylor.95 In Parratt, the Supreme Court responded to a
prison inmate's allegation of a Fourteenth Amendment violation, holding
that either "necessity" or "impracticality" may justify lesser pretermination
due process standards.9 6 The Court provided, however, that "meaningful
means" to assess the lower standards must be available to comply with due
process.97 Therefore, as long as post-termination hearings are available to
resolve conflicting issues from the pretermination hearing, employers are
not required to grant extensive pretermination hearings.98
182, 184 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that pretermination hearing does not require
presence of impartial decision-maker, provided that post-termination decision-
maker is impartial) with Vanelli v. Reynolds Sch. Dist. No. 7, 667 F.2d 773, 779 (9th
Cir. 1982) (holding that school board's participation in pretermination decision
did not render school board impermissibly biased in conducting post-termination
hearing).
94. McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1562 (quoting Schaper, 813 F.2d at 715-16).
95. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
96. Id. at 539. In Parratt, a state prison inmate ordered hobby materials
through the mail with money from his prison account. Id. at 530. The package
arrived at the prison and two employees of the prison hobby center checked the
package in. Id. Because the inmate was in the segregation unit when the package
arrived, prison officials did not permit him to have the package; however, upon his
release from this unit, prison officials could not find the package. Id. The inmate
brought an action under the Fourteenth Amendment, seeking to recover the
materials that the prison hobby manager negligently lost. Id.; see also Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530-36 (1984) (holding that intentional destruction of pris-
oner's personal property during "shakedown" did not violate due process because
of availability of post-deprivation remedies); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc.,
339 U.S. 594, 598, 601-02 (1950) (upholding seizure and destruction of drugs with-
out pre-seizure hearing under Fifth Amendment); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S.
245, 257-58 (1947) (upholding seizure of property without prior hearing in order
to protect public against economic harm of incompetently managed bank).
97. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 539. For a further discussion of due process compli-
ance under Parratt, see TIBE, supra note 1, § 10-14, at 729-31 (questioning whether
Parratt stands for proposition that procedural due process is never violated if state's
legal system provides constitutionally acceptable remedies). See also Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Reme-
dies, 93 COLuM. L. REv. 309, 339-58 (1993) (discussing constitutional adequacy of
state law under Parratt).
98. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 538. The Parratt Court also noted that a "full and
meaningful hearing" is often difficult for employers to provide and is not required
by due process. Id. at 541. But see Maslan, supra note 19, at 1102 ("While a post-
termination hearing reviews the merits of the termination, it cannot cure defects
in the pretermination hearing itself."). In addition, courts often hold that public
employees have the responsibility of utilizing available post-termination proce-
dures. See, e.g., Rathjen v. Litchfield, 878 F.2d 836, 839-40 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding
that although city personnel director fraudulently induced employee to accept vol-
untary demotion, failing to utilize city's grievance procedure for remedy did not
violate employee's due process rights); Riggins v. Board of Regents, 790 F.2d 707,
711-12 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that employee who failed to utilize post-termina-
tion process waived any denial of procedural due process claim); Dwyer v. Regan,
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Finally, in recent opinions, circuit courts have specifically addressed
the relationship between procedural due process and the termination of
tenured professors.99 Most notably, in Cotnoir v. University of Maine Sys-
tes,100 a public university provost recommended in a report that Cotnoir,
a tenured professor, be dismissed for improperly granting numerous cred-
its to a student.101 During a meeting, however, the president did not show
Cotnoir the report, nor did Cotnoir ask to see it.10 2 Therefore, the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the University's fail-
ure to provide notice of its intention to terminate a tenured professor's
employment violated the professor's due process rights.10 3 Similarly, in
777 F.2d 825, 834-35 (2d Cir. 1985) (same), modified on other grounds, 793 F.2d 457
(2d Cir. 1986); Dusanek v. Hannon, 677 F.2d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1982) ("The
availability of recourse to a constitutionally sufficient administrative procedure sat-
isfies due process requirements if the complainant merely declines or fails to take
advantage of the administrative procedure."); Correa v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131,
645 F.2d 814, 817 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that school employee cannot claim
denial of due process where employee did not utilize post-termination
procedures).
A recent Supreme Court case, however, stated that a violation of procedural
due process "is not complete when deprivation occurs; it is not complete unless
and until the State fails to provide due process." Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113,
126 (1990). Under this approach, an inquiry "would examine the procedural safe-
guards built into the statutory or administrative procedure of effecting the depriva-
tion, and any remedies for erroneous deprivations provided by statute." Id. See
generally Weimer v. Amen, 870 F.2d 1400, 1403-05 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding post-
deprivation remedies adequate when state officials committed random and unau-
thorized acts).
99. See, e.g., Cotnoir v. University of Maine Sys., 35 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 1994)
(holding that University denied tenured professor due process where University
did not inform professor of employment termination prior to decision to termi-
nate); Calhoun v. Gaines, 982 F.2d 1470, 1476-77 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that
college's failure to reveal intention to terminate full-time professor and denial of
post-termination hearing denied professor of due process); Collins v. Marina-Mar-
tinez, 894 F.2d 474, 480-81 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding that university's disguise of
pretermination hearing's purpose, failure to provide information regarding spe-
cific charges against professor and denial of post-termination procedures improp-
erly denied professor due process).
100. 35 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 1994).
101. Id. at 8. Cotnoir was a tenured professor at the University of Maine. Id.
A fellow professor sent a letter to the Dean of Students stating that a student within
Cotnoir's department had received 56 credits without attending classes. Id. The
University Provost interviewed Cotnoir and others regarding this matter, and then
presented a report to the University President. Id. This report contained an "ex-
plicit recommendation" for Cotnoir's dismissal. Id. The President then sent
Cotnoir a letter in which he asked Cotnoir to meet with him to "clarify [his] role in
this series of events." Id. The letter indicated that "disciplinary action may result
from my investigation of your participation in this serious academic matter." Id.
102. Id. In addition, Cotnoir did not make a statement, but answered twelve
questions about the student receiving the credits. Id. Ten days later, the Univer-
sity President informed Cotnoir that Cotnoir's employment would be terminated
in four days. Id.
103. Id. at 11. The University argued that because it informed Cotnoir of the
charges against him, it complied with procedural due process requirements. Id.
Finding this procedure inadequate, however, the First Circuit held that the Univer-
628 (Vol. 41: p. 607
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Calhoun v. Gaines,1 0 4 a public college official withdrew a one-year contract
offer from Professor Calhoun and refused to schedule a hearing or com-
ply with due process provisions.10 5 The Tenth Circuit held that the failure
to provide a professor with post-termination procedures violated due pro-
cess.10 6 Thus, the guiding principles of Loudermill, intertwined with circuit
court interpretations of specific due process issues, provided a generous,
albeit confusing, backdrop against which the Third Circuit would under-
take its analysis in McDaniels v. Rick.107
III. FACTs
Mr. McDaniels was a tenured college professor at Delaware County
Community College ("DCCC") in Pennsylvania.10 8 In 1990, two male stu-
dents complained that McDaniels sexually harassed them. 109 In the fol-
lowing year, John Federici, a student in McDaniels's class, became irate
concerning the "D" that McDaniels gave him in the course.11 0 During the
sity did not provide Cotnoir a hearing "where he had a fair opportunity to present
his side of the story." Id. Moreover, the First Circuit found that the University did
not properly notify Cotnoir about its proposed action. Id. But see Newman v. Bur-
gin, 930 F.2d 955, 960 (1st Cir. 1991) ("The Due Process Clause of the Constitu-
tion, however, does not require the University to follow any specific set of detailed
procedures as long as the procedures the University actually follows are basically
fair ones ....").
104. 982 F.2d 1470 (10th Cir. 1992).
105. Id. at 1473. Calhoun, a full-time professor at Oklahoma City Community
College, accepted his tenth one-year employment contract according to College's
procedure. Id. at 1472. After receiving complaints about Calhoun's performance,
the College's Vice-President withdrew the employment offer. Id. at 1473. The Col-
lege did not inform Calhoun of his right to a due process hearing, as provided in
the College's written policies. Id.
106. Id. at 1467-77. The court further stated its belief that a "reasonable offi-
cial would have known that the process afforded .... was constitutionally inade-
quate." Id. at 1476.
107. For a further discussion of the Loudermill principles, see supra notes 54-65
and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit interpreta-
tion of the notice requirement, see supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
108. McDaniels v. Flick, 59 F.3d 446, 449 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
1017 (1996). Delaware County Community College ("DCCC") employed McDan-
iels from 1971 until his termination in December 1991. Brief for Appellant at 7,
McDaniels v. Flick, 59 F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 1995) (Nos. 94-1838 & 94-1935). DCCC
employed McDaniels pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. Id.
109. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 449. DCCC investigated these allegations, deciding
to send McDaniels a letter stating that he violated DCCC's sexual harassment pol-
icy. Id. DCCC warned McDaniels that "reoccurrence of such incidents will result
in serious disciplinary action including termination of employment." Id. at 449-50.
McDaniels sent a written response to DCCC, along with a signed copy of DCCC's
letter to indicate that he reviewed it. Id.
110. Id. McDaniels gave Federici a "D" for various reasons, including Feder-
ici's failure to turn in a term paper on time. Id. Originally, McDaniels gave him an
"Incomplete" for the course. Id. at 450 n.3. Regardless, Federici was particularly
upset because he needed at least a "C" in the course to transfer the credit to a
degree he was working on at Pennsylvania State University. Id. at 450. McDaniels
claimed that Federici "became irate and threatened to get him." Id. Conse-
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resolution of this dispute, Federici informed the Assistant Dean that Mc-
Daniels sexually harassed him."' 1
On November 18, 1991, Federici met with the Director of Personnel
Services ("Director") to further explain his various encounters with Mc-
Daniels. 112 Federici alleged, among other things, that McDaniels
massaged his neck in the library, spoke to him on repeated occasions
about "tough love" and made sexual innuendos and explicit sexual ad-
vances during on-campus appointments with Federici. 115
On November 27, 1991, the Director requested that McDaniels meet
him in his office that afternoon and asked McDaniels to bring his
quently, McDaniels reported the incident to the Assistant Dean of DCCC, who was
McDaniels's direct supervisor. Id.
111. Id. The Assistant Dean contacted McDaniels, after Federici contacted
him concerning the "D" on the final term paper. Id. McDaniels explained that
Federici's paper was of poor quality. Id. Figuring that Federici misunderstood
McDaniels, the Assistant Dean called Federici, suggesting that he again contact
McDaniels in order to clear up the situation. Id. Federici refused, stating some-
thing similar to "I can't do that." Id. Federici ultimately told the Assistant Dean
that McDaniels "always wanted to counsel [him] and always wanted to see [him],"
and that McDaniels talked to him about "tough love." Id.
112. Id. At the meeting on November 18, 1991, Federici additionally ex-
plained that he had difficulty with McDaniels's class and that he was seeing a coun-
selor regarding anxiety and stress problems. Id. The Director of Personnel
Services ("Director") compiled his meeting notes into summary form, which Feder-
ici later reviewed and signed. Id.
113. Id. Portions of the summary of Federici's meeting with the Assistant
Dean read:
While in the library studying Uohn Federici] fell asleep & awoke to see
[Frank McDaniels] who was massaging John's neck.... After that inci-
dent, [McDaniels] came into the library more & more as if he was looking
for John.
John was in the library on another occasion with his friend Tom &
[McDaniels] came in to talk to them. [McDaniels] seemed to keep look-
ing at the "lower half" of John's body while he spoke. [McDaniels] did
not make eye contact with John but continued to stare at his lower body.
John made an appointment to speak... about the added class work
to improve his grade. [McDaniels] repeatedly said he wanted to help
John & counsel him. [McDaniels] asked ifJohn had heard of tough love
&John said no. With this, [McDaniels] proceed (sic) to say that he would
help him & "If I need to I will hug you, beat the crap out of you or put my
penis in your mouth." [McDaniels] reached over & put both of his hands
on John's face & seemed to be about to cry & said, "I really want to help
you.
At the appointment [McDaniels] discussed make-up work & repeat-
ing the final exam but then went into another description of the tough
love thing with another explicit reference to sexual matters.... [McDan-
ielsJ also said John should not discuss this with anyone since he could
loose (sic) his job. [McDaniels] said he would "get him" if he mentioned
their conversations to anyone.
Id. at 450-51 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (alterations in original).
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gradebook.11 4 Before the scheduled meeting, McDaniels spoke with the
Director and inquired about the reason for the meeting.11 5 The Director
told him only that it concerned a "student problem." 116
At the outset of the meeting, the Director told McDaniels about the
student's sexual harassment claim.'1 7 Additionally, the Director stated
that he and the Dean would recommend McDaniels's termination." 8 The
Director told McDaniels "that the purpose of the meeting was to under-
stand what the charge was, to have an opportunity for [the Director] to
relay to [McDaniels] what the charges were specifically and for him to
have a chance to respond.""19 Yet McDaniels later testified that he "did
not comprehend" that the meeting was a "pretermination hearing." 12 0
After explaining the purpose of the meeting, the Director told Mc-
Daniels that it was Federici who had lodged the charges against him and
further discussed the student's allegations. 12 1 Upon being questioned,
however, McDaniels denied each alleged sexual encounter.12 2 At trial, the
114. Id. at 451. McDaniels's secretary gave him a note at 11:30 a.m. asking
him to call the Director. Brief for Appellee at 13, McDaniels v. Flick, 59 F.3d 446
(3d Cir. 1995) (Nos. 94-1838 & 94-1935). McDaniels spoke with the Director at
12:15 p.m. regarding a possible afternoon meeting. Id. McDaniels and the Direc-
tor scheduled the meeting for 2:30 that afternoon. Id. Prior to scheduling this
meeting, the Director verified Federici's enrollment in McDaniels's marketing
class. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 451. The Director additionally consulted the Dean of
the College, as well as the college doctor, to determine if Federici had a record of
unusual behavior. Id.
115. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 451.
116. Id.
117. Id. Those present at the meeting were the Dean, the Director and Mc-
Daniels. Id.
118. Id. McDaniels later testified that when he heard this statement, he was
"shocked, dismayed ... thrown offguard." Id.
119. Id. The Dean confirmed the Director's statement. Id. Later, both the
Director and the Dean testified that the Director told McDaniels that he could
adjourn the meeting at any time. Id.
120. Id. McDaniels also explained:
Well, if they did say it, they said it in the same sentence whereby they said
they were recommending my termination to the board of trustees. If they
did say it, they had blown my mind so bad at that point, they had disorga-
nized me-disoriented me so much that I didn't remember them saying
it, if they did say it.
Id.
121. Id. Upon hearing this news, McDaniels told those at the meeting that
Federici threatened to "get" him. Id. The Director and the Dean testified that at
this point in the meeting, McDaniels asked if he could save his job if he agreed to
get counseling. Id. at 452.
122. Id. The Director did not read or show the written summary to McDan-
iels, and it is unclear whether the Director described these allegations in a direct
manner. Id. The Director asked whether McDaniels touched Federici's neck or
face in the library; McDaniels responded no, but that he recalled an instance
where he saw Federici sitting in the library. Id. McDaniels also denied staring at
the lower part of Federici's body in the presence of another student. Id. Upon
being questioned about his "tough love' statement, McDaniels responded that
Federici initiated the topic. Id. In testimony, McDaniels denied that the Director
19961 NOTE
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Director and the Dean testified that they told McDaniels to contact them if
he had any additional information about the matter, and that they subse-
quently terminated the meeting. 123 In addition, the Director and Dean
testified that they advised McDaniels of the various options available to
him in dealing with the problem. 12 4
On December 4, 1991, the Director sent McDaniels a letter informing
him that DCCC had investigated the sexual harassment charges and that,
consequently, he "would recommend that the Board of Trustees terminate
McDaniels' [s] employment for sexual harassment."'125 This letter also set
forth McDaniels's post-termination rights.12 6 On December 9, 1991, the
Director sent McDaniels a similar letter, again informing him of the right
to a further investigation of the charges against him. 127 The letter in-
formed McDaniels that he had five days within which to exercise this
right. 128
On December 12, 1991, McDaniels wrote to the college's President,
requesting that the President further investigate the sexual harassment
charges.129 McDaniels stated that he "formally filed a grievance with the
intent of going all the way through the grievance procedure (arbitration)
& beyond to civil action to avoid termination."'130 The President replied
ever questioned him about the sexually explicit remark quoted by Federici or
about McDaniels's alleged warning that Federici must keep their conversations
quiet. Id. Finally, the Director brought McDaniels's prior reprimand for sexual
harassment to his attention. Id. McDaniels stated that the present allegations,
however, were false. Id.
123. Id. McDaniels did not recall this discussion. Id. Instead, McDaniels tes-
tified that the Director told him to "leave campus speedily" and to return only "to
the extent necessary to gather his possessions." Brief for Appellee at 15, McDaniels
v. Flick, 59 F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 1995) (Nos. 94-1838 & 94-1935). According to Mc-
Daniels's deposition testimony, the pretermination meeting lasted approximately
45 minutes. Id. at 10.
124. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 452. DCCC reminded McDaniels of his collective
bargaining agreement with DCCC, DCCC's sexual harassment policy and Penn-
sylvania Local Agency Law. Id. In addition, McDaniels could appeal a decision to
the President of DCCC. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. The letter stated:
As I mentioned during the pre-termination meeting last Wednesday, you
may want to have the [Board of Trustees's] action heard through the
grievance procedure as provided under the terms of the collective bar-
gaining agreement or you may elect to have a hearing before a commit-
tee of the Board of Trustees.
Id.
127. Id. The letter stated that DCCC's sexual harassment policy provided Mc-
Daniels with the option to have the President of DCCC or his designee investigate
and review the complaint. Brief for Appellant at 13, McDaniels (Nos. 94-1838 & 94-
1935).
128. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 452. In addition, the letter encouraged McDaniels
to telephone the Director if he had any questions. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 453. Later, however, McDaniels testified that he did not ever initi-
ate a grievance procedure. Id. Rather, he was merely "looking into it." Id. Mc-
[Vol. 41: p. 607
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to McDaniels on December 18, 1991, expressing his belief that DCCC had
adequately reviewed the allegations against McDaniels and stating that he
would recommend McDaniels's termination at that evening's Board
meeting.1 31
At the Board of Trustees's meeting, the Board voted unanimously to
terminate McDaniels's employment.13 2 In response, McDaniels began ar-
bitration procedures as provided within DCCC's collective bargaining
agreement.1 3 3 Before arbitrators could be selected, however, McDaniels
filed a section 1983 suit against the college and the Board of Trustees,
along with a state law claim under Pennsylvania Local Agency Law, alleg-
ing a violation of his procedural due process rights.13 4 Adhering to nu-
merous decisions in the district court, the Third Circuit held that because
DCCC held a pretermination hearing and encouraged post-termination
responses, McDaniels received adequate due process protections.1 35
Daniels additionally included in the letter: "Enclosed is a chronologized transcript
of my total contact with this student. I emplor (sic) you to thoroughly investigate
his alligations (sic) personally & overturn the termination decision.... Every sin-
gle meeting [with Federici] was for class business only." Id.
131. Id. Before writing his response to McDaniels on December 18, 1991, the
President reviewed the documents relating to the allegation, and also met with the
Director, Dean and Assistant Dean to further review their findings. Id.
132. Id. The Board voted unanimously to dismiss McDaniels only after they
discovered that other students previously charged McDaniels with violations of
DCCC's sexual harassment policy in 1990 and 1991, and that DCCC investigated
the charges, held a pretermination hearing and provided McDaniels with an op-
portunity to respond. Brief for Appellant at 14, McDaniels (Nos. 94-1838 & 94-
1935). Prior to the Board meeting, however, DCCC did not supply McDaniels with
copies of the March 1990 and November 18, 1991 reports describing the conduct
justifying his termination. Id.
133. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 453. McDaniels did not appeal or ask for a hearing
before the Board of Trustees. Id.
134. Id. at 448. In February 1992, McDaniels filed an action in district court
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. The pertinent part of this code provision states that
"[e]very person who, under color of [law] ... subjects.., any citizen of the United
States... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured." 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1994).
McDaniels initially filed charges against the Board of Trustees of DCCC, both
individually and in their official capacity, and against DCCC. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at
448. As a result of McDaniels's claim, DCCC stayed arbitration proceedings pend-
ing its disposition. Id. at 453.
135. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 446-47. The unusual procedural background of
this case warrants description. Id. at 448. After McDaniels filed his initial action
against DCCC in February of 1992, DCCC filed a motion for summary judgment.
Id. The district court denied DCCC's motion. Id. Upon denying a motion for
reconsideration, the district court stated that there was an issue of material fact
surrounding DCCC's actions in providing McDaniels with notice of the charges
against him or of the pretermination hearing's purpose. Id. An additional issue
before the court was whether DCCC properly informed McDaniels of the specific
accusations during the meeting. Id.
Both sides moved for summary judgment after discovery. Id. The court
granted partial summary judgment on liability to McDaniels; however, after com-
mencing the jury trial for damages, the court determined that a genuine issue of
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Applicable Standard
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated that
the starting point in determining the procedural due process rights of ten-
ured professors is the decade-old standard set forth by the Supreme Court
in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill.'3 6 The Third Circuit traced
the reasoning of Loudermill to provide a framework against which it could
compare the actions taken in McDaniels.
1 37
fact existed concerning the presence of a procedural due process violation. Id.
McDaniels elected to have the court declare a mistrial. Id. In response, the court
issued a written opinion stating that it would dismiss the trustees as defendants
because they were not involved in the pretermination events leading to McDan-
iels's termination. Id. at 448-49.
The court divided the second trial into three phases, with the first phase focus-
ing on liability. Id. at 449. At the close of McDaniels's case, both McDaniels and
DCCC moved unsuccessfully for summary judgment. Id. In response to specific
questions, however, the jury returned a verdict that:
(1) the college adequately notified McDaniels that the November 27,
1991 meeting was a pretermination hearing on Federici's sexual harass-
ment charges; (2) the college informed McDaniels of the substance of
the case against him during that meeting; but (3) McDaniels was not
given a meaningful opportunity to respond and tell his side of the story.
Id. Thus, in view of the third finding, DCCC could be liable. Id. Accordingly, in
the second phase, the jury determined that if DCCC had provided McDaniels with
an adequate opportunity to respond, it would not have terminated his employ-
ment. Id. Consequently, the court entered an order reinstating McDaniels as a
faculty member and awarded him $134,081 in lost wages. Id. In the third phase,
the jury did not award McDaniels damages for noneconomic harm. Id.
DCCC then moved for judgment as a matter of law. Id. In addition, McDan-
iels filed a post-trial motion for a new trial on the issue of damages. Id. In oppos-
ing DCCC's motion, McDaniels argued that DCCC was "estopped" from moving
for judgment as a matter of law "because the college's attorney in his closing argu-
ment at the third phase led the jury to believe that the college agreed to 'make
peace' with McDaniels and make him whole." Id. The court did not estop DCCC,
but denied both post-trial motions. Id. DCCC immediately filed a notice of ap-
peal, and McDaniels filed a notice of cross-appeal. Id.
In the Third Circuit, McDaniels moved to dismiss the appeal and cross-appeal,
relying again on the DCCC attorney's statements made during closing arguments
at the third phase. Id. The district court then filed a memorandum opinion ex-
plaining its reasoning behind rejecting the "judicial estoppel" argument. Id.
Agreeing with the district court, the Third Circuit denied the motion to dismiss
the appeal and cross-appeal. Id.
On appeal, DCCC argued that the district court improperly denied its mo-
tions for judgment as a matter of law. Id. McDaniels cross-appealed from the dis-
trict court's dismissal of his case against the individual members of the Board of
Trustees and from the denial of his post-trial motion requesting a new trial for
noneconomic damages. Id. See generally Federal Court Says Delco College Gave Man a
Chance, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 12, 1995, at W3 (summarizing recent trial).
136. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 453-54 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985)). For a further discussion of the Loudermill facts
and opinion, see supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
137. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 454. See generally Foster, supra note 7, at 1079-82
(setting forth and discussing Supreme Court's reasoning in Loudermill); Howard,
supra note 7, at 1124-25 (same); Gamso, supra note 5, at 266-71 (same).
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First, the Third Circuit affirmed the existence of a property right in
continued employment that is inherent in state law.13 8 Interpreting the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Third Circuit quoted the
Loudermill Court and stated that "[a] n essential principle of due process is
that a deprivation of... property 'be preceded by notice and opportunity
for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case."' 13 9 The Third Circuit
restated this requirement, agreeing with the Loudermill Court that due pro-
cess requires "some kind of hearing" prior to discharging an employee
with a constitutionally protected property interest in employment. 140
Moreover, in light of Loudermill, the Third Circuit recognized that an
additional element essential to ensuring due process is a pretermination
opportunity to respond. 141 Following the Loudermill precedent, the Third
Circuit stated that the "pretermination 'hearing,' though necessary, need
not be elaborate."'1 42 Rather, the "procedural requisites for the hearing
can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and
the nature of the subsequent proceedings." 143 The Third Circuit adhered
to the Loudennill Court's holding that an employer must balance the inter-
ests of the employer and employee in making pretermination decisions.'4
The Third Circuit concluded that a pretermination opportunity to re-
138. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 454 (citing Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538-39). In Mc-
Daniels, property rights grew out of Ohio state law. Id. For a further discussion of
the historical development of property rights, see supra notes 19-65 and accompa-
nying text.
139. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 454 (quoting Loudermil, 470 U.S. at 542) (citation
omitted).
140. Id. (quoting Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542). The Loudermill Court relied
upon the prior Supreme Court holdings in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
569-70 (1972) and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972), which discussed
the hearing requirement in the context of college professors. For a further discus-
sion of Roth's development of the hearing concept, see supra notes 24-31 and ac-
companying text. For a further discussion of the hearing concept in Sindermann,
see supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
141. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 454 (citing Loudennill, 470 U.S. at 542). For a gen-
eral discussion of a public employee's right to a pretermination hearing, see Mas-
lan, supra note 19, at 1094-96 ("The essence of [the right to a hearing] 'reflects a
fundamental value in our American constitutional system."' (quoting Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971))).
142. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 454 (citing Loudermil4 470 U.S. at 545). After the
first phase of the trial, the district court charged the jury that "[t]he notice may be
written or oral ... [i]t need not be advance notice .... the notice of the charges
may be given at the hearing itself." Id.
143. Id. (citing Loudermil, 470 U.S. at 545). For a further discussion of the
balancing test utilized in considering competing interests, see supra note 63.
144. Mdaniels, 59 F.3d at 454. Specifically with regard to the employee, the
Loudermill Court held that "[t]he tenured public employee is entitled to oral or
written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evi-
dence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story." Id. (quoting Loudermil
470 U.S. at 546). See generally McCrea, supra note 43, at 38 (discussing respective
interests of public employers and employees).
1996] NOTE 635
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spond, coupled with post-termination administrative procedures, meets
the due process requirements of Loudermill.145
The Loudermill framework allowed the Third Circuit to determine
whether DCCC had satisfied these due process requirements. 146 Despite
the established Loudermill requirements, McDaniels claimed that tenured
professors deserve more substantial due process protections than other
public employees. 147 The Third Circuit disagreed, rejecting McDaniels's
argument that unlike other types of public employees, a tenured profes-
sor's right to teach implicates "the societal value of academic freedom." 148
The Third Circuit further rejected McDaniels's reliance upon Skehan
v. Board of Trustees149 to bolster his argument for enhanced procedural
due process rights.15 0 The Third Circuit explained that the Skehan hold-
ing adhered to an earlier Third Circuit opinion, Chung v. Park.'51 In
Chung, the Third Circuit set forth pretermination safeguards that colleges
may grant to tenured professors.' 52 Thus, given the permissibility of the
safeguards and the fact that both cases were pre-Loudermil4 the Third Cir-
cuit reemphasized that only Loudermill adequately defined the minimum
145. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 454 (citing Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 547-48). For a
further discussion of the Loudermill standard's impact, see Foster, supra note 7, at
1084 ("The major questions that the Court left unanswered is the appropriate
depth of a pre-termination hearing when there are factual disputes between em-
ployer and employee."); Howard, supra note 7, at 1125-28 (arguing that Loudermill
should have addressed property interests beyond scope of right of continued em-
ployment); Gamso, supra note 5, at 271-72 (arguing that Loudermill enhances au-
thority of balancing test approach).
146. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 454. The parties agree that as a tenured college
professor, McDaniels had a protected property interest in continued employment.
Id. For a further discussion of the historical development of property rights in
continued employment, see supra notes 19-65 and accompanying text.
147. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 455.
148. Id. McDaniels further stated that "[t]enure is the pillar upon which aca-
demic freedom rests." Id. The court did not dispute this assertion, but instead
questioned its relevancy. Id. Because DCCC did not discharge McDaniels in retal-
iation for exercising First Amendment rights, free speech was not an issue in this
matter. Id. In further attacking McDaniels's claim for greater due process rights,
the Third Circuit pointed to the lack of a basis on which to distinguish his case
from Loudermill. Id.
149. 669 F.2d 142, 152 (3d Cir. 1982). For a further discussion of Skehan's
facts, see supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
150. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 455.
151. 514 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1975).
152. Id. For a complete list of the pretermination safeguards set forth in
Chung, see supra note 48. Neither Chung nor Skehan held that procedural due
process required all six of the pretermination safeguards. Skehan, 669 F.2d at 152;
Chung, 514 F.2d at 386. Additionally, neither case distinguished the use of these
safeguards based on the fact that the employees were professors whose employers
owed them extra protection of their academic freedom. See McDaniels, 59 F.3d at
455 (stating neither Chung nor Skehan required all six safeguards, nor required
extra protection for professors).
30
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol41/iss2/6
due process requirements for the instant proceeding. 153 The Third Cir-
cuit also rebutted McDaniels's claim by balancing the respective interests
of the parties involved. 154
B. The Standard Applied to McDaniels
Finding that the Loudermill requirements of notice, explanation of the
charges and an opportunity to respond were applicable to the case at
hand, the Third Circuit faced the task of properly applying these decade-
old concepts.15 5 In so doing, the Third Circuit reversed the trial court's
decision. 156 The Third Circuit stated that, under the Loudermill principles,
DCCC gave McDaniels adequate notice concerning the November 27,
1991 meeting and subsequently gave him an explanation of the charges
brought against him.157 Accordingly, the court found that the time be-
tween the November meeting and the Board of Trustees's December
meeting at which DCCC terminated McDaniels was sufficiently long
enough for him to make an appropriate pretermination response. 158 The
McDaniels court further concluded that because the President read and
answered McDaniels's letter, DCCC allowed him sufficient opportunity to
153. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 456. The Third Circuit particularly noted the in-
completeness of the Skehan decision. Id. Skehan did not consider post-termination
remedies, which the Loudermill Court later required. Id. Thus, the Third Circuit
further diminished the effectiveness of McDaniels's Skehan argument. Id.
154. Id. The Third Circuit noted that DCCC had an interest in protecting its
reputation. Id. Conversely, the Third Circuit was aware of DCCC's sexual harass-
ment policy and of its commitment to protecting its students. Id.
155. Id. In order to support the general application of Loudermill, the McDan-
iels court cited prior Third Circuit cases. Id.; see Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ.,
913 F.2d 1064, 1077-78 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that suspension without pay also
required prior notice and hearing); Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't, 840
F.2d 1139, 1144-46 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that suspension complied with due
process where employer held interview to orally notify employee of charges, al-
lowed employee to explain and notified him of suspension); Gniotek v. City of
Phila., 808 F.2d 241, 244 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that due process does not require
advance notice of pretermination hearing; "Notice is sufficient, (1) if it apprises
the vulnerable party of the nature of the charges and general evidence against
him, and (2) if it is timely under the particular circumstances of the case.").
156. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 456. For an in-depth discussion of the procedural
history in McDaniels, see supra note 135.
157. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 456. For a further discussion of the nature of the
notice that DCCC granted McDaniels, see supra notes 114-20 and accompanying
text. For a further description of the alleged incidents of sexual harassment, see
supra note 113 and accompanying text.
158. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 456. Records of the meeting demonstrate that both
the Director and the Dean solicited initial responses from McDaniels throughout
the pretermination hearing. Id. In addition, the Director and Dean encouraged
McDaniels to respond to these charges at any time after the hearing. Id. For a
further discussion of the various communications between DCCC and McDaniels
after the pretermination hearing, see supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
1996] NOTE
31
Kruft: McDaniels v. Flick: Terminating the Employment of Tenured Profess
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
respond. 159 Thus, the Third Circuit rejected McDaniels's allegation that
DCCC afforded him insufficient due process rights. 160
The Third Circuit first addressed the issues of advance notice and
explanation of the charges. 16 1 The court cited its earlier ruling in Gniotek,
where the court held that advance notice is not required.1 62 Like the
court in Gniotek, the Third Circuit in McDaniels rejected McDaniels's no-
tion that DCCC did not adequately explain the charges against him.163
Both parties agreed that DCCC did not give McDaniels a written summary
of the charges against him.' 64 The Third Circuit held, however, that
charges against an individual "need not be in great detail as long as it
allows the employee 'the opportunity to determine what facts, if any,
within his knowledge might be presented in mitigation of or in denial of
the charges."'" 65
159. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 456. Moreover, the court stated that McDaniels's
denial of charges and attribution of them to Federici's emotional problems mani-
fested his response during the pretermination meeting. Id. Additionally, McDan-
iels's letter to the President provided further evidence that McDaniels responded
after the meeting and that DCCC provided him with ample opportunity to "tell his
side of the story before termination." Id. at 456-57.
160. Id. at 457. McDaniels claimed that the process was not sufficient because
DCCC did not provide him with notice until the beginning of the pretermination
meeting. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. (citing Gniotek v. City of Phila., 808 F.2d 241, 244 (3d Cir. 1986)).
The Third Circuit cited its decision in Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't, 840 F.2d
1139 (3d Cir. 1988), to further legitimize its interpretation of the notice require-
ment. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 457. In Copeland, the Third Circuit held that an em-
ployer satisfies due process requirements (and integrally, the notice requirement)
"where a policeman was told that he had tested positive for illegal drug use, was
allowed to respond, and was told that he would be suspended with intent to dis-
miss." Id. (quoting Copeland, 840 F.2d at 1142-46). These events happened within
the course of a single interview. Copeland, 840 F.2d at 1142. For a further discus-
sion of the Copeland facts and opinion, see supra note 74.
163. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 457. For a further discussion of DCCC's procedure
in explaining the charges to McDaniels, see supra notes 114-24 and accompanying
text.
164. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 457; see Brief for Appellant at 25-26, McDaniels v.
Flick, 59 F.3d. 446 (3d Cir. 1995) (Nos. 95-1838 & 95-1935) (arguing that due
process did not obligate DCCC to share "every detail" of its evidence with McDan-
iels or to allow him to confront his accusers); see also Linton v. Frederick County
Bd. of County Comm'rs, 964 F.2d 1436, 1440 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating "[dlue pro-
cess does not mandate that all evidence on a charge or even the documentary
evidence be provided"); Green v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 716 F.2d 1191, 1193 (7th
Cir. 1983) (finding that due process does not require opportunity to attack credi-
bility of accuser). But see Brief for Appellee at 24, McDaniels (Nos. 95-1838 & 95-
1935) (arguing that DCCC's neglecting to show statement to McDaniels signifi-
cantly affected his opportunity to respond).
165. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 457 (quoting Gniotek, 808 F.2d at 244). Thus, the
Third Circuit accorded the term "adequate explanation" a liberal interpretation.
See generally Derstein v. Kansas, 915 F.2d 1410, 1413 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that
employer did not violate due process even where employee did not know all rele-
vant facts and employer did not give employee copy of investigative transcript).
[Vol. 41: p. 607638
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Having discussed the issues of notice and explanation of the charges,
the Third Circuit next turned to the adequacy of the time during which
DCCC asked McDaniels to respond.1 66 First, the Third Circuit distin-
guished this case from the Eleventh Circuit opinion in Adams v. SewelLV67
In Adams, a county administrator placed an employee on paid personal
leave at the end of a meeting. 168 In McDanies, however, DCCC gave Mc-
Daniels more than three weeks to respond to the allegations against him;
therefore, the court found that Adams was not comparable. 169 Instead,
the Third Circuit relied upon the Tenth Circuit opinion in Derstein, where
a court administrator gave an employee ten days to respond to charges
against him.170 In addition, the Third Circuit distinguished its prior rul-
ing in Morton in which a prison administrator suspended an employee
without pay at the pretermination hearing, as opposed to after the
hearing. 17 1
In responding to McDaniels's contention that DCCC's termination
procedure violated Pennsylvania Local Agency Law, the Third Circuit
brought the issue of procedural due process rights full-circle.' 72 The
For a further discussion of the facts of Derstein, see supra notes 81-83 and accompa-
nying text.
166. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 457. McDaniels claimed that he was in a state of
shock during the meeting, primarily because DCCC did not give him prior notice
of the meeting's purpose. Id. McDaniels also claimed that this affected his oppor-
tunity to respond to the charges. Id.
167. 946 F.2d 757 (11th Cir. 1991). For a further discussion of the facts in
Adams, see supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
168. Adams, 946 F.2d at 761.
169. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 457. DCCC held the initial pretermination hearing
on November 27, 1991. Id. at 451. The Board of Trustees terminated McDaniels's
employment at their meeting on December 18, 1991. Id. at 453.
170. Derstein, 915 F.2d at 1410. For a further discussion of the facts of Derstein,
see supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
171. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 458 (citing Morton v. Beyer, 822 F.2d 364 (3d Cir.
1987)). In Morton, because the employee could not convince the administrators at
the pretermination hearing to delay his suspension, the employee suffered adverse
employment action. Morton, 822 F.2d at 366. For a further discussion of the Mor-
ton decision, see supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. Comparatively, DCCC
held McDaniels's pretermination hearing on November 27, 1991 and terminated
McDaniels on December 18, 1991. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 451-53.
172. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 458. The Third Circuit stated that this argument
"flies in the face of both logic and law." Id. Returning to the foundations of prop-
erty rights in continued employment, the court stated that whether such right ex-
ists is a matter of state law. Id. (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972)). For an in-depth discussion of the state/federal relationship surrounding
property rights and procedural due process, see supra notes 29-30 and accompany-
ing text.
Both parties agreed that DCCC is a "local agency" for purposes of Penn-
sylvania Local Agency Law. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 460-61. The relevant Penn-
sylvania statute defines "local agency' as -[a] government agency other than a
Commonwealth agency.'" Id. at 461 n.8 (quoting 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 101
(West Supp. 1994)). Sections 752 and 754 provide employees with a right to ap-
peal a college decision in state court. Id. at 461; see Monaghan v. Board of Sch.
Dirs., 618 A.2d 1239, 1241 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (noting that state court can
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court reiterated that minimum procedural due process requirements are
"a matter of federal law"; consequently, they are "not diminished by the
fact that the State may have specified its own procedures that it may deem
adequate. '173
C. Pretermination Hearings and Impartial Decision-makers
The Third Circuit next addressed McDaniels's claim that the DCCC's
failure to provide an impartial decision-maker at the pretermination hear-
ing violated his due process rights.174 The Third Circuit had not yet ad-
dressed such a claim in the employment termination context.
175
review final decision of local agency). In addition, the court can modify or set
aside an agency decision if there are violations of an "employee's constitutional
rights, an error of law, or ... necessary findings of fact were not supported by
substantial evidence." 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 754(b) (West Supp. 1994); see
Coyle v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 654 A.2d 15, 16 (1994)
(noting that court must affirm local agency decision unless substantial evidence
does not support finding); Gabriel v. Trinity Area Sch. Dist., 350 A.2d 203, 205 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1976) (same); Springfield Sch. Dist. v. Shellam, 328 A.2d 535, 537-38
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974) (same). Thus, with these options available, the Third Cir-
cuit concluded that the state offered sufficient due process protection of McDan-
iels's property rights. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 461.
173. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 458 (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491
(1980)).
174. Id. at 459. This issue is important because McDaniels argued that the
pretermination procedure applied to his case was a "sham." Id. at 458. McDaniels
argued that DCCC never believed Federici's allegations. Id. Rather, DCCC used
these allegations to reduce the number of faculty in order to save money. Id. In
addressing this issue, the district court relied upon an Eleventh Circuit case, Mc-
Kinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995).
McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 459. The district court stated that even if McDaniels substan-
tially proved his allegations, these allegations would be "irrelevant to the claim that
pretermination procedural due process was denied because the sufficiency of post-
termination protection was not at issue." Id.
For a general discussion of bias and its affect upon a Loudermill hearing, see
Maslan, supra note 19, at 1098-1104 (arguing that "[w]here the decisionmaker is
impermissibly biased against the employee, both the initial review of factual con-
clusions and the opportunity to invoke the employer's discretion are lost").
175. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 459. The Third Circuit dealt with a similar situa-
tion in Rosa v. Resolution Trust Corp., 938 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1991). In Rosa, a bank
placed its pension plan under the conservatorship of the Resolution Trust Corpo-
ration (RTC). Id. at 388. Initially, the RTC decided to continue the plan and
assume payment obligations. Id. at 389. Later, however, after two contribution
payments, the RTC decided to stop contribution and consequently sent out notices
that the plan would be terminated in two months. Id. The plan's beneficiaries
sued the RTC. Id. at 390. The Financial Institutions Reform and Recovery En-
forcement Act, however, required that some of the plaintiffs' claims first be
presented to the RTC for review first. Id. The plaintiffs stated that this claims
procedure violated due process because it required them to submit their claims to
a biased entity without the benefit of a hearing. Id. at 396. Nevertheless, the Third
Circuit held that the claims procedure did not violate due process. Id. at 397. The
court reasoned that even after the exhaustion of the RTC claims procedure, the
plaintiffs had the post-deprivation option of obtaining a de novo court evaluation
of their claims. Id.
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Therefore, the court looked to the Eleventh Circuit decision in McKinney
v. Pate for persuasive authority.176 Relying upon McKinney and upon simi-
lar rulings of the Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits that due process does not
require impartial decision-makers at the pretermination hearing as long as
post-termination hearing decision-makers are impartial, the Third Circuit
buttressed its finding that DCCC fulfilled McDaniels's due process
rights.177
Finally, the Third Circuit re-emphasized the importance of the
Supreme Court precedent set forth in Parratt v. Taylor.178 Applying the
Court's reasoning in Parratt to the employment termination context, the
Third Circuit noted that an "unduly cumbersome" and "unreasonably in-
vasive" procedure may result if due process required impartial decision-
makers to be present at the pretermination stage. 179
D. The Dissent: A View of "Fundamental Fairness"
The McDaniels dissent hinged its argument upon the notion that
"[f]undamental fairness is the hallmark of the procedural protections af-
forded by the Due Process Clause."' 8 0 Like the majority, the dissent also
176. 20 F.3d 1550 (lth Cir. 1994). For a general discussion of the facts of
McKinney, see supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
177. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 459-60; see, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113,
126 (1990) (holding that "[tihe constitutional [procedural due process] violation
... is not complete when the deprivation occurs; it is not complete unless and until
the State fails to provide due process"); Walker v. City of Berkeley, 951 F.2d 182,
184 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that due process does not require impartial decision-
maker at pretermination hearing, if post-termination decision-maker is impartial);
Duchesne v. Williams, 849 F.2d 1004, 1005 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that Loudermill
only requires a "right of reply" in front of official responsible for discharge);
Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709, 715 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that in
employment termination cases, due process does not require states to have impar-
tial decision-maker at pretermination hearing).
178. 451 U.S. 527 (1981). For a further discussion of the facts of Parratt, see
supra note 96. See also TRIBE, supra note 1, § 10-14, at 726-29 (arguing that mean-
ingful post-deprivation hearing satisfies requirements of due process).
179. McDanies, 59 F.3d at 460. The Third Circuit reasoned that employee's
direct supervisors often make termination decisions because such individuals are
aware of the "employee's abilities and shortcomings as well as the needs and inter-
ests of the employer organization." Id. Therefore, simply by virtue of their posi-
tions, such individuals are "likely targets" for claims of bias or improper motive, as
in McDaniels's claim that budget constraints motivated DCCC to fire him. Id.
Moreover, the court reasoned:
While these charges may have merit in certain cases, to require that the
state ensure an impartial pretermination hearing in every instance would
as a practical matter require that termination decisions initially be made
by an outside party rather than the employer as charges of bias always
could be made following an in-house discharge.
Id.
In addition, the Third Circuit stated that neutral tribunals at the post-termina-
tion stage are adequate, thereby reducing the need for "excessive pretermination
precaution." Id.
180. Id. at 461 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
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founded its argument upon the Loudermill principles.' 8 1 While acknowl-
edging the importance of the Gniotek holding, however, the dissent supple-
mented it by stating that "'the timing and content of notice . . . will
depend on appropriate accommodation of the competing interests in-
volved."' 182 Thus, the dissent concluded that the particular circumstances
in McDaniels required advance notice. 183
The dissent compared the circumstances of McDaniels to those in the
Third Circuit case of Morton, where an administrator gave an employee
vague notice of a meeting to take place later that day.18 4 In McDaniels, the
dissent found that DCCC gave McDaniels notice with even less detail than
that given in Morton, as well as an inadequate opportunity to review the
evidentiary report against him.185 Thus, the dissent argued that the re-
quirement of advance notice was not properly fulfilled. Accordingly, the
dissent stated that because DCCC did not give McDaniels adequate notice
of the subject or purpose of the pretermination hearing, it unfairly denied
him a "realistic opportunity" to mount a defense and to respond to the
181. Id. (Aldisert, J., dissenting); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
470 U.S. 532, 547-48 (1985) (summarizing due process requirements). In particu-
lar, the McDaniels dissent noted that "[t] o ensure that the pretermination hearing
is a meaningful one, the employee 'is entitled to oral or written notice of the
charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportu-
nity to present his side of the story."' McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 461-62 (Aldisert, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Loudermil 470 U.S. at 546). For a further discussion of the
Loudermill decision, see supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
182. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 462 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (quoting Goss v. Lo-
pez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975)). The Third Circuit has held that advance notice is
not necessary to meet procedural due process requirements. Gniotek v. City of
Phila., 808 F.2d 241, 244 (3d Cir. 1986). For a complete discussion of the Gniotek
decision, see supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
183. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 462 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). The dissent noted
that DCCC did not give McDaniels adequate notice of the subject or purpose of
the November 27, 1991 meeting. Id. (AldisertJ., dissenting).
184. Id. at 462-63 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (citing Morton v. Beyer, 822 F.2d
364 (3d Cir. 1987)). For a further discussion of the facts and holding of Morton,
see supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
185. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 462 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). The dissent broke
down its Morton comparison into several components. Id. (Aldisert,J., dissenting).
First, although the Director called McDaniels to the meeting many months after
the alleged incident, unlike the corrections sergeant in Morton, McDaniels was
never aware that he was being investigated at any time prior to this meeting. Id.
(Aldisert,J., dissenting). Second, the Director gave McDaniels vague notice of the
meeting; the Director did not inform McDaniels that the meeting was a
pretermination hearing or that a student filed a sexual harassment complaint
against him. Id. (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Third, a legal representative did not
accompany McDaniels at the meeting, nor did he have the opportunity to review
Federici's signed three-page statement. Id. (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Finally, while
the prison administrator in Morton provided the corrections officer with a depart-
mental hearing after the initial hearing, DCCC refused to give McDaniels further
pretermination review or investigation. Id. (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
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allegations.1 86 In light of Third Circuit precedent, the dissent reasoned
that DCCC violated McDaniels's due process rights. 187
E. McDaniels and Due Process: A Critical Analysis
In finding that DCCC did not violate McDaniels's due process rights,
the Third Circuit took a necessary step toward clarifying the application of
the general guidelines set forth in Loudermill.'8 8 First, the court accurately
applied the Loudermill principles in view of Third Circuit precedent.1 89
Next, the Third Circuit struck an appropriate balance between the inter-
ests of McDaniels and those of DCCC.190 The Third Circuit, however,
could have given further attention to recent cases from other circuit
courts discussing the due process rights of tenured professors.1 91 Never-
theless, the Third Circuit rendered a comprehensive analysis upon which
its district courts and other circuit courts may rely in the future.1 9 2
First, the Third Circuit correctly interpreted and applied the question
of "what process is due," as addressed in LoudermilL' 93 The Third Circuit
186. Id. at 462-63 (Aldisert, J., dissenting); see also Bignall v. North Idaho Col-
lege, 538 F.2d 243, 247 (9th Cir. 1976) (stating that "purpose of notice is to allow a
complainant to marshall a case against the firing body"). The dissent stated that
DCCC provided McDaniels with only an "impromptu" opportunity to hear some of
the evidence against him and present his side of the story. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at
462 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Moreover, the court noted:
Particularly in light of the significant lapse in time between the alleged
improper conduct and the hearing in [the Director's] office, [McDan-
iels] should have been provided sufficient time, at the very least, to re-
count the facts in his own mind and thus to prepare himself to
demonstrate to [the Director and Dean] that reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that the charges were true did not exist.
Id. at 463 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (quoting Morton v. Beyer, 822 F.2d 364, 371
n.11 (3d Cir. 1987)). The dissent further stated that the college "intentionally
flung [charges] upon him out of the blue." Id. (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
187. Id. (Aldisert, J., dissenting). The dissent did not expressly address the
question of whether due process requires the presence of an impartial decision-
maker at the pretermination hearing; rather, the dissenting opinion focused pri-
marily upon the adequacy of notice. Id. (Aldisert,J., dissenting). In deciding that
DCCC denied due process, however, the dissent compared the post-termination
rights available in Morton with those that DCCC afforded McDaniels. Id. at 462
(Aldisert, J., dissenting).
188. For a further discussion of the general Loudemnill principles, see supra
notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
189. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's application of Loudermill
principles, see supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text. For an analysis of the
Third Circuit's application of its precedent, see infra notes 195-203 and accompa-
nying text.
190. For a statement of the Mathews balancing test, see supra note 63.
191. For a further discussion of recent circuit court cases involving the due
process rights of tenured professors, see supra notes 99-106 and accompanying
text.
192. For an in-depth discussion of the Third Circuit analysis in McDaniels, see
supra notes 136-79 and accompanying text.
193. For a further discussion of due process requirements as set forth in
Loudennill see supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
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utilized Loudermilfs general holding and accurately supplemented it with
other Third Circuit opinions.194 For example, the Third Circuit relied
upon the examination of the notice requirement in Gniotek v. City of Phila-
delphi aJ95 While Gniotek did not mandate advance notice, it further indi-
cated that the nature of notice depends upon an "appropriate
accommodation of the competing interests involved."1 96
In light of Gniotek, the Third Circuit balanced the competing interests
in determining whether McDaniels's notice, pretermination hearing and
opportunity to respond satisfied procedural due process requirements.1 9 7
Because McDaniels had essentially three weeks in which to respond to the
allegations of sexual harassment, DCCC sufficiently protected his property
rights in continued employment.1 9 8 On the other hand, DCCC had a re-
sponsibility to protect its students, and particularly the interests of John
Federici, the alleged victim. 199 Thus, the college's procedure satisfied the
"fundamental fairness" sought after by the dissent. 200
The Third Circuit also weighed the competing interests recognized by
the dissent, and specifically relied upon Third Circuit precedent in Morton
v. Beyer.20 1 As the majority stated, the fact that the administrator's suspen-
sion of Morton at his pretermination hearing violated due process demon-
strates that Morton is distinguishable from McDaniels, where the
termination occurred three weeks after the hearing.20 2 Thus, it is clear
194. For discussions of prior Third Circuit cases utilized by the McDaniels
court, see supra notes 149, 151, 155.
195. 808 F.2d 241, 244 (3d Cir. 1986). For a further discussion of the facts of
Gniotek, see supra notes 71-72.
196. Gniotek, 808 F.2d at 244 (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579
(1975)). For a further discussion of the competing interests, see supra note 63.
197. McDaniels v. Flick, 59 F.3d 446, 456 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
1017 (1996).
198. Id. The Director gave McDaniels notice of the nature of the November
27, 1991 meeting. Id. The Board of Trustees did not hold their termination meet-
ing until December 18, 1991. Id. During this time, DCCC encouraged McDaniels
to respond, and he did so. Id. The Supreme Court has previously pointed out,
however, that in some circumstances, a valid public interest may justify postponing
a pretermination hearing. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.7 (1972)
(citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)). For a further discussion
of limitations upon the necessity of a pretermination hearing, see supra note 28
and accompanying text.
199. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 456. For a further discussion of Federici's sexual
harassment claims, see supra note 113 and accompanying text.
200. See McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 461 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) ("Fundamental fair-
ness is the hallmark of the procedural protections afforded by the Due Process
Clause."). For a further discussion of the dissent's rationale, see supra notes 180-87
and accompanying text.
201. McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 458 (citing Morton v. Beyer, 822 F.2d 364 (3d Cir.
1987)). For a further discussion of the facts and holding of Morton, see supra notes
76-78 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the dissent's reliance
upon Morton, see supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
202. See McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 452-53, 458 ("[Morton] is completely distinguish-
able from this case."); Morton, 822 F.2d at 366. In holding that the administrator
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that the Loudermill due process requirements must be carefully viewed in a
specific context and balanced with the competing interests involved.20 3
The Third Circuit could have strengthened its opinion by using re-
cent First and Tenth Circuit opinions involving the procedural due pro-
cess rights of tenured professors.20 4 For example, in Cotnoir v. University of
Maine Systems,20 5 the First Circuit held that a university violated a tenured
professor's due process rights by neglecting to notify the professor of its
plan to terminate his employment.2 0 6 The Third Circuit could have uti-
lized this holding to contrast the adequacy of the notice given to McDan-
iels at the pretermination hearing.2 0 7
In addition, the Third Circuit could have used circuit court decisions
involving tenured professors to diffuse McDaniels's claim that tenured
professors deserve more due process protection than the "run-of-the-mill,
Loudermill-type employee.1208 Although in Cotnoir and Calhoun the First
and Tenth Circuits respectively found that a college violated a tenured
professor's due process rights, neither circuit based such a finding upon
an amplified Loudermill standard.2 0 9
V. IMPACT
The Third Circuit's interpretation of the Loudermill requirements for
upholding procedural due process rights provided helpful guidance
within the Third Circuit in dealing with the termination of tenured profes-
violated Morton's due process rights, the Third Circuit stated that Morton's hear-
ing was "'in no way commen[su]rate with the gravity of the sanction"' to be im-
posed on him. Id. at 368 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.
532, 547 (1985)).
203. For a statement of the competing interests in McDaniels, see supra note154.
204. For a list of cases dealing specifically with procedures involved in termi-
nating the employment of tenured professors, see supra notes 99-106 and accom-
panying text. The McDaniels court considered, however, a Tenth Circuit case with
facts very similar to McDaniels, in which the employer did not violate a tenured
employee's procedural due process rights because he was not terminated at his
pretermination meeting, and the employer granted the employee ten days to re-
spond. Derstein v. Kansas, 915 F.2d 1410, 1413 (10th Cir. 1990). For a further
discussion of Derstein, see supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
205. 35 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 1994).
206. Id. at 11. For a further discussion of the facts of Cotnoir, see supra notes
101-03 and accompanying text.
207. See McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 451. At the beginning of the pretermination
hearing, DCCC told McDaniels about Federici's allegations and about the possibil-
ity of his termination. Id.
208. See id. at 455. For a further discussion of McDaniels's claim to height-
ened due process protections, see supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text. For
a further discussion of the Third Circuit's rebuttal to this claim, see supra notes
148-54 and accompanying text.
209. For a discussion of the facts of Cotnoir, see supra notes 101-03 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of the facts of Calhoun, see supra notes 105-06 and
accompanying text.
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sors' employment.2 10 In holding that due process does not require an
impartial decision-maker at a pretermination hearing, the Third Circuit
expanded the realm of acceptability under Loudermill211 This expanded
concept of what constitutes due process, however, extends far beyond the
scope of tenured professors.2 12 As the Third Circuit determined that the
termination of a tenured professor does not require a heightened
Loudemill approach, McDaniels will influence the termination procedures
of all public employees with a property interest in continued
employment.213
Moreover, McDaniels reinforces an employer's duty to balance com-
peting interests when deciding what termination procedures are appropri-
ate. 214 Consequently, in view of the employer's flexibility in making this
determination, McDaniels will likely restrict tenured professors and other
public employees from appealing employer decisions to the courts.2 15
Finally, despite the employer's balancing task, the McDaniels decision
provides public employers and employees with a reminder of their mutual
210. See Howard, supra note 7, at 1125-29 (discussing impact of Loudermill). In
the Loudermill majority opinion, Justice White failed to consider other issues sur-
rounding the hearing, including whether a discharged employee has a right to a
"'neutral decision maker; to present evidence and witnesses, and to confront and
cross-examine evidence and witnesses used by the opposition before the deci-
sionmaker; the right to have an attorney make the presentation; a decision based
on the record; and a statement of the reasons for the decision."' Id. at 1127 (cita-
tion omitted). On the contrary, in view of those issues that the Third Circuit ex-
pounded upon in McDaniels, the court did not overturn any of its prior cases
dealing with procedural due process rights of public employees. For a further dis-
cussion of Third Circuit cases involving public employees, see supra notes 70-79
and accompanying text.
211. See McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 460. The court limited this dismissal of "exces-
sive pretermination precaution" to instances where the state provides a neutral
tribunal at the post-termination stage that can address charges of improper mo-
tives. Id.
212. See id. at 458 (discussing employees' general property rights in continued
employment). For a discussion of the early expansion of due process and property
rights, see supra notes 8 & 21.
213. See McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 455-56 (dismissing McDaniels's claim that col-
lege professors deserve more due process than "run-of-the-mill, Loudermilltype em-
ployees"). For a more detailed discussion of McDaniels's claim to heightened due
process, see supra notes 14748 and accompanying text.
214. See McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 455-56 (discussing necessity of balancing com-
peting interests); see also McCrea, supra note 43, at 38-39 (discussing employers'
termination and disciplinary procedures). In certain emergency situations, an em-
ployer may balance the interests at hand and may determine that a pretermination
hearing is not appropriate. Id. In addition, employers are accorded a certain mea-
sure of leniency in that the notice they give may be written or oral. Id.
215. See generally McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 462-63 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing insufficiency of McDaniels's post-termination rights). Because of the availabil-
ity of post-termination remedies and an employer's ability to balance competing
interests, employers may, inadvertently or not, deny employees adequate
pretermination proceedings. Thus, employers may restrict employees' due process
to the post-termination hearing stage.
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obligations during termination proceedings.2 16 By following the Third
Circuit's approach to these obligations, other courts can insure that if pub-
lic entities retain the ability to use proper discretion in employment deci-
sions, the roots of procedural due process will remain firmly grounded.2 17
Corinne D. Kruft
216. See generally McCrea, supra note 43, at 38. Public employers should re-
view and become familiar with their termination and disciplinary procedures to
ensure they grant adequate pretermination due process. Id. Similarly, public em-
ployees must be aware of the importance of responding to pretermination pro-
ceedings and of utilizing all post-termination remedies available. Id. For a more
detailed view of the consequences of failing to utilize post-termination proceed-
ings, see supra note 98.
217. See generally Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541
(1985) (stating that right to due process is guaranteed by Constitution). For a
further discussion of the foundations and purposes of the Due Process Clause, see
supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
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-ROBERT P. GARBARINO
With great admiration for his commitment to the Villanova University
School of Law, the editors of the Villanova Law Review dedicate this issue to
its first Editor-in-Chief, Dean Robert P. Garbarino, as he begins his
retirement. Since he first entered the School of Law as a member of the
Class of 1956, Dean Garbarino has been a dedicated and vibrant member
of the Villanova community. He has touched the lives of many,
particularly those of the hundreds of students who sought his wisdom and
guidance during his tenure as Associate Dean for Administration. Those
who do not know him personally are undoubtedly familiar with his
perpetual smile and good humor. The following pages contain sentiments
expressed by the friends and colleagues who know him best and truly
understand the depth of his character and the extent of his commitment
to the School of Law. These tributes serve as a brief chronological
summary of Dean Garbarino's career accomplishments. As editors, we
thank Dean Garbarino for the instrumental role he played in the creation
and development of the Villanova Law Review. As students, we thank him
for his years of service, wisdom and friendship.
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